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# **Global Drivers of Gross and Net Capital Flows\***

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## Abstract

While prior to the global financial crisis the empirical international capital flow literature has focused on net capital flows (the current account), since the crisis there has been an increased focus on gross flows. In this paper we jointly analyze global drivers of gross flows (outflows plus inflows) and net flows (outflows minus inflows) by estimating a latent factor model. We find evidence of two global factors, which we call the GFC (global financial cycle) factor and a commodity price factor as they closely track respectively the Miranda-Agrippino and Rey asset price factor and an average of oil and gas prices. These factors together account for half the variance of gross flows in advanced countries and forty percent of the variance of gross flows in both groups of countries. We also analyze the heterogeneity across countries in the impact of the two factors. One of the key findings is that the impact of the GFC factor on both gross and net capital flows is stronger in countries that have larger net debt liabilities. Other asset classes (FDI and portfolio equity) do not significantly impact the exposure to the GFC factor.

**Keywords:** capital inflows and outflows, gross and net capital flows, financial global-ization, global financial cycle, global capital flows cycle

JEL classification: F3, F4

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# 1 Introduction

Until the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 the empirical literature on international capital flows has been mainly focused on net capital flows, which equal the current account. A substantial literature focuses on the drivers and consequences of large changes in the current account, either in the form of large net inflows (capital flow bonanzas) or large net outflows (sudden stops).<sup>1</sup> Both have significant consequences for the real economy in terms of growth, inflation, asset prices, exchange rates and financial crises that have been extensively documented. However, after the global financial crisis there has been a shift in the empirical capital flows literature towards a focus on gross capital flows, which include capital inflows (purchases of domestic assets by foreigners), capital outflows (purchases of foreign assets by domestic investors) as well as their sum.<sup>2</sup> There are several reasons for this shift in focus. Gross external assets and liabilities have increased enormously in many countries since the early nineties. The run-up of large gross positions leads to the risk that these positions may be suddenly unwound in the future. In addition, the global financial crisis itself saw an unprecedented global retrenchment with sharp simultaneous declines in both capital inflows and outflows. Forbes and Warnock (2012), one of the first papers to shift the focus to gross flows, argue that the strong link between gross and net flows that used to exist has weakened as inflows and outflows co-move more strongly than they used to. As a result, we see an increased volatility of gross flows without a higher volatility of net flows. The recent literature has aimed to understand what factors drive these gross capital flows. While the increased interest in gross flows makes sense, so does the focus on net flows in the literature before the global financial crisis. Net capital inflows are equal the excess of national consumption and investment over disposable income, which naturally leads to strong business cycle consequences of large changes in net flows. This in turn can lead to challenges for policy makers.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the global drivers of gross and net flows jointly, in a way connecting the older capital flow literature that analyzes the drivers of net flows with the more recent one that focuses on drivers of gross flows. From hereon we will define gross flows as outflows plus inflows and net flows as outflows minus inflows. From a pure accounting perspective gross and net flows may or may not be related. An equal increase in inflows and outflows raises gross flows, but does not affect net flows. But an increase in outflows and a smaller increase in inflows raises both gross and net flows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Some papers include Calvo (1998), Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993,1996), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2008), Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2006), Cardarelli, Elekdag and Kose (2009), Eichengreen and Adalet (2005), Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1996) and Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Some papers in this literature are Avdjiev et al. (2017), Barrot and Serven (2018), Broner et al. (2013), Bruno and Shin (2015), Cerutti, Claessens and Rose (2017), Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015), Davis (2015), Forbes and Warnock (2012), Ghosh et al. (2012), Milesi-Ferretti and Cedric Tille (2011) and Obstfeld (2012).

develop a model where gross and net flows are uncorrelated, with global shocks driving gross flows and relative shocks (shocks in Home relative to Foreign country) driving net flows. But the model has only two countries, which are perfectly symmetric. More generally, in a multi-country model with asymmetries across countries, global shocks will affect both gross and net flows.

In general the connection between gross and net flows is an empirical matter. We therefore ask whether global drivers of gross flows also have a significant effect on net flows. If this is the case, there are clear policy consequences as significant net flows generally impact the real economy. It has led Rey (2013) to argue that countries may need to choose between monetary autonomy and international financial integration.<sup>3</sup> While the global drivers themselves are outside of the control of individual countries, they may be able to take action that affects their exposure to these global drivers, such as imposing capital controls. We will therefore also investigate what drives the heterogeneity across countries of the impact of global drivers on gross and net capital flows.

We analyze capital flows of a broad set of 58 countries over the period 1996-2015. This is the period over which gross capital flows in many countries have become very volatile. For the median advanced country gross capital flows were six times as volatile as net flows during this period. In order to identify the global factors, we estimate a static factor model for capital inflows and outflows of the 58 countries. Both inflows and outflows are driven by the same global factors. This allows us to analyze the impact of these global factors on both gross flows, adding the factor loadings for outflows and inflows, and net flows, taking the difference in the factor loadings for outflows and inflows.

We find evidence of two global factors, which we refer to as the GFC (global financial cycle) factor and the commodity price factor. The GFC factor is highly correlated with the asset price factor that Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) estimate to measure the global financial cycle. It represents a common component in 858 asset price series. The global financial cycle in turn has been shown to be highly correlated with center country economic conditions, such as US monetary policy, growth, banking leverage and asset price risk (VIX). The high correlation of our first global capital flows factor with the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (MAR) asset price factor is noteworthy as the latter is identified by very different means and with very different data. MAR use a dynamic factor model with daily financial asset price data, while we use a static factor model with annual capital flow quantity data. We refer to the second global capital flows factor as the commodity price factor as it is highly

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ In other words, the trilemma (one cannot simultaneously have a fixed exchange rate, financial integration and monetary autonomy) has become a dilemma. Others, like Klein and Shambaugh (2015) and Obstfeld (2015), provide evidence that even in today's world of integrated financial markets countries continue to maintain monetary autonomy under flexible exchange rate systems. But there is no doubt that significant volatility of net flows puts additional burdens on monetary authorities.

correlated with (and closely tracks) the average of world oil and gas prices.

These two global factors together explain about half of the variance of gross flows of advanced countries and forty percent of the variance of gross flows of emerging markets. They therefore play a central role as drivers of gross capital flow volatility over the past two decades. But the key finding is that these same global factors also account for about forty percent of the variance in net capital flows in both advanced countries and emerging markets. Clearly therefore, these global drivers do not simply lead inflows and outflows of countries to fluctuate in unison. By having such an important impact on net flows, they will generally have significant business cycle implications as well that policy makers will aim to mitigate.

The fact that the commodity price factor has an important effect on net capital flows is perhaps not surprising as there is obvious heterogeneity across countries with respect to fuel exports, imports and consumption. But we find that the GFC factor on average contributes equally to the variance of net capital flows as the commodity price factor and for advanced countries is a more important driver of the variance of net flows. This suggests significant heterogeneities across countries associated with financial sector exposures that lead to net capital flows in response to global swings in risk perception or risk aversion.

The heterogeneity across countries that leads to net capital flows in response to global shocks is directly related to heterogeneity of the factor loadings. If the factor loadings were the same for all countries, they would also be the same for inflows and outflows as world net flows are zero. In that case global factors would not have any effect on net flows. Consistent with the important impact of the global factors on net capital flows, we find significant heterogeneity of the factor loadings. In order to understand what drives this heterogeneity, we regress the factor loadings on a wide range of variables associated with financial and trade integration, macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic conditions, institutional quality, financial development, risk and the exchange rate system. One of the key findings is that the impact of the global financial cycle factor on both gross and net capital flows is stronger in countries that have larger net debt liabilities, where debt refers to banking and portfolio debt. Other asset classes (FDI and portfolio equity) do not significantly impact the exposure to the GFC factor.

The paper is related to a small recent literature that estimates latent factor models for capital flows, as well as the literature on push and pull factors of capital flows and the recent literature on the high and rising correlation between capital inflows and outflows. We will briefly review these related literatures in Section 2. After that, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 discusses the data and some descriptive moments. Section 4 describes our factor analysis. Section 5 discusses the importance of the global factors identified in Section 4 for both gross and net capital flows. Section 6 sheds light on the drivers of the heterogeneity in the factor loadings across countries for both gross and net capital flows. Section 7 briefly discusses the sensitivity of the results to the data frequency. While we use annual data in most of the paper, here we discuss how results are affected by using quarterly data. Section 8 concludes.

# 2 Related Literature

The paper relates to a small recent literature of latent factor models applied to international capital flows. This includes Cerutti et al. (2017), Barrot and Serven (2018), Sarno et al. (2016) and Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015). The approach we take here differs from these papers in several respects. The most important difference is that we consider simultaneously the impact of global factors on aggregate gross and net capital flows. None of these other papers do this. Sarno et al. (2016) estimate a factor model for high frequency net bilateral equity and bond flows, but do not analyze gross flows or aggregate net flows (the current account).<sup>4</sup> The three other papers only analyze gross flows.

A related difference relates to the factor model itself assumed in these papers. Cerutti et al. (2017) estimate both static and dynamic factor models. They estimate global factors separately for each component of capital flows (FDI flows, debt flows, equity flows, credit flows), for inflows and outflows, and for advanced and emerging economies. Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) estimate a dynamic factor model for capital inflows to emerging markets that includes a common factor and region-specific factors. The factors again vary across components of capital flows. Sarno et al. (2016) estimate a dynamic factor model for US equity and bond net bilateral flows that includes a global factor, a destination-country factor and an asset-specific factor (equity versus bonds). Barrot and Serven (2018) estimate a factor model that includes a global factor and factors for three groups of countries (advanced, emerging and developing). As in the other papers, the global factor is estimated separately for capital inflows and outflows. Our approach differs in several ways. First, we estimate global factors that are the same for capital inflows and outflows. This way we can consider the simultaneous impact of the global factors on gross flows and net flows. It is impossible to do this if the global factors are different for inflows and outflows. Second, we allow for generally more than one global factor (and in fact find two significant ones).<sup>5</sup> Third, we do not allow for additional factors, such as region-specific factors or emerging market/advanced country factors. Factors that have a significant effect on advanced country net capital flows by construction must also have a significant effect on net capital flows of other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>These are monthly data of net flows for the United States.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Cerutti et.al. (2017) and Sarno et.al. (2016) assume one global factor, while Barrot and Serven (2018) allow for more than one global factor but find only one significant global factor.

countries. Limiting factors to certain groups of countries is therefore problematic, especially when considering net capital flows. We therefore only consider global latent factors.

In this paper we will use annual data for aggregate capital inflows and outflows. With the exception of Barrot and Serven (2018), the papers mentioned above use higher frequency data and consider components of capital flows. Cerutti et al. (2017) and Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) use quarterly FDI flows, debt flows, equity flows and banking flows for a large number of countries, while Sarno et al. (2016) use monthly bilateral US equity and bond outflows. We use annual rather than quarterly data as this reduces measurement error. We have computed all our results for quarterly data as well, but the larger measurement error at the quarterly frequency weakens the common component of capital flows across countries. Same et al. (2016) use even more high frequency monthly data, but these are based on relatively high quality TIC data that are only available for the United States. In addition we only report results for aggregate capital flows rather than their components as there is significant substitution among asset classes. We will illustrate that this substitution weakens the common component across countries for a particular asset class, making global drivers appear less important than they are. We should also point out that the business cycle impacts of capital flows tend to operate through the current account, which is equal to total net inflows across all asset classes.

Another related literature regresses capital flows on various observable push and pull factors. While there is a significant literature that considers the impact of push and pull factors on net capital flows, the recent literature has considered the impact of these factors on capital inflows and outflows separately, as well as components of capital inflows and outflows. Recent examples include Avdjiev et. al. (2017), Broner et al. (2013), Bruno and Shin (2015), Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011).

There is significant evidence that global push factors such as global risk (VIX), global growth, global liquidity and global bank leverage are important drivers of global capital flows. Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that global push factors, in particular global risk, can lead to large changes in capital inflows and outflows (surges and stops for inflows and flight and retrenchment for outflows). Broner et al. (2013) find that during global crises capital inflows and outflows both collapse. Avdjiev et al. (2017) develop a dataset that distinguishes between banks, corporates and sovereigns. They find that a positive global credit shocks raises inflows to and outflows from domestic banks and corporates, while having little effect on sovereigns. Bruno and Shin (2015) focus on banking flows and find that global push factors such as global bank leverage and global bank equity growth are important.

These literatures have also identified evidence of heterogeneity across countries in their sensitivity to global factors. Barrot and Serven (2018) find that capital flows are more sensitive to the global factor in countries with greater financial openness, deeper financial systems and more rigid exchange rate systems. Fratzscher (2012) uses high frequency data on net flows to find that the exposure to global push factors depends on the quality of institutions, country risk and the strength of domestic macro fundamentals. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) focus on the decline in gross capital flows during the Great Recession. They find that countries with a larger sum of banking assets plus liabilities, and larger net liabilities in debt instruments, experienced sharper declines in capital inflows and outflows.

Finally, the paper is related to a literature on the correlation between capital inflows and outflows. Broner et.al. (2013) document a high and increasing correlation between capital inflows and outflows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) show empirically and theoretically that this is related to an increase in global financial integration, while trade integration weakens the correlation between capital inflows and outflows. The higher correlation between inflows and outflows implies a greater volatility of gross flows relative to net flows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) document that in advanced countries the standard deviation of net flows relative to GDP has not changed much when comparing the period 1975-1989 to 1990-2015, while the volatility of gross flows relative to GDP almost tripled on average. The latter is consistent with the growing stock of external assets and liabilities relative to GDP, which has tripled across these two periods for the average advanced country. Avdjiev et al. (2017) argue that banking flows are a critical driver of the increasing correlation between capital inflows and outflows.

# **3** Data and Descriptive Moments

### **3.1** Country and Time Coverage

Our sample consist of annual capital flows data for 58 countries over the 1996-2015 period. The full list of countries is presented in Table 1. There are 20 advanced countries and 38 emerging markets.<sup>6</sup> The sample covers 81 percent of global external assets and liabilities and 74 percent of world GDP in 1996.<sup>7</sup> It contains all the major industrialized countries, a broad set of emerging markets that includes all the major ones such as China, Russia and India, as well as the countries that experienced the largest capital flow reversals during the global financial crisis, such as Iceland and the Baltic states. We do not include many small developing countries as these economies tend to be relatively financially closed and would

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The latter include a couple of developing countries. But since most of these countries are emerging markets, we will refer to them that way.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Here we exclude from the world total the countries or territories classified by the IMF staff as offshore financial centers: Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Macao, Malaysia, Monaco, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.

bias the overall results.

The sample period is chosen to include the last two decades for two reasons. First, prior to this period the global financial landscape was dramatically different, with much smaller levels of external assets and liabilities and capital flows, especially for advanced countries. We like to have a sample that is representative of the current state of global financial integration. Second, if we started the sample before the mid-1990s, we would lose Russia and most of the Eastern European countries.<sup>8</sup>

The use of annual data also has a double motivation. The first is simply data availability. Using data at a quarterly frequency would mean losing a handful of the emerging market countries in the sample, in particular China. The second reason is that capital flow data tends to be very noisy, especially at a quarterly frequency. Using an annual frequency helps eliminate a lot of this noise.<sup>9</sup> However, in the Online Appendix we replicate all the results for quarterly data. In Section 7 we briefly discuss these results.

The capital flow data is from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). We focus our attention on aggregate capital inflows and outflows. As discussed above, others often consider components of aggregate flows: FDI flows, debt flows, equity flows, banking flows and reserve accumulation. This tends to lower the correlation of capital flows across countries and correspondingly weaken the role of common global drivers. This is the result of substitution between the various components.

The full list of variables and data sources is presented in the data appendix.

#### **3.2** Definition of Variables

First define  $OF_{i,t}$  to be aggregate outflows out of country *i* and  $IF_{i,t}$  to be aggregate inflows into country *i*. We define net flows as the difference between outflows and inflows and gross flows as the sum of outflows and inflows:

$$NF_{i,t} = OF_{i,t} - IF_{i,t} \tag{1}$$

$$GF_{i,t} = OF_{i,t} + IF_{i,t} \tag{2}$$

Net flows can change without a change in gross flows and gross flows can change without a change in net flows. But they may also be related. For example, a rise in outflows without a change in inflows raises both gross and net flows. Putting data measurement problems aside, net outflows are also equal to the current account.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>In factor analysis, the length of the estimated factor is restricted to the length of the balanced panel, so starting the sample period earlier would require removing Russia and these Eastern European countries from the sample entirely.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Some authors, like Forbes and Warnock (2012), prefer to use a two-quarter moving average.

World outflows, inflows and gross flows are computed by summing over the corresponding flows for all countries in the sample. They are denoted respectively  $OF_{w,t}$ ,  $IF_{w,t}$  and  $GF_{w,t}$ . Although world outflows are equal to world inflows, this is not exactly the case in the data due to measurement error and incomplete country coverage. We also define  $IF_{adv,t}$  and  $OF_{adv,t}$  as the sum across all the advanced countries and  $IF_{eme,t}$  and  $OF_{eme,t}$  as the sum across all the emerging markets.

We denote capital flows normalized by the sum of external assets and liabilities as lowercase, so  $if_{i,t} = 100 * \frac{IF_{i,t}}{(A+L)_{i,t}}$  where  $(A+L)_{i,t}$  is the sum of the stocks of external assets and liabilities in country *i*. Normalized world capital flows are  $if_{w,t} = 100 * \frac{IF_{w,t}}{(A+L)_{w,t}}$  and  $of_{w,t} = 100 * \frac{OF_{w,t}}{(A+L)_{w,t}}$ , where  $(A+L)_{w,t}$  is the sum of the stock of external assets and liabilities across all countries in the sample. Normalized world gross flows are then  $gf_{w,t} = of_{w,t} + if_{w,t}$ .

The reason for dividing capital inflows and outflows by external assets and liabilities is that these flows correspond to changes in external assets and liabilities (abstracting from valuation effects). As the magnitude of external assets and liabilities increases, one may expect the size and volatility of the corresponding flows to increase as well. Dividing by external assets plus liabilities is therefore a natural way to make sure that the series are stationary. While gross flows can be expected to rise in magnitude with the stock of external assets and liabilities, this is not necessarily the case for net flows, which by construction are equal to the current account and are therefore constrained by trade flows. For net flows we therefore also report some results when scaling by GDP, which is also a more natural measure when we are concerned with the business cycle impact of net flows. Net flows scaled by GDP is denoted  $n f_{i,t}^{gdp} = 100 * \frac{NF_{i,t}}{GDP_{i,t}}$ .

#### **3.3** A First Look at the Data

Figure 1 shows charts for outflows, inflows, gross flows and net flows (scaled both ways) for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets. Overall the magnitude of fluctuations of the scaled outflows, inflows and gross flows is similar for the two groups of countries. But one should keep in mind that since these flows are scaled by external assets and liabilities, which on average are almost four times as big in the advanced countries, the magnitude of these capital flows is substantially larger in advanced countries than in emerging markets if we were to scale by GDP.

The sharp drop in gross flows during the global financial crisis is clearly visible for both advanced countries and emerging markets. Especially emerging markets experienced a significant rise in gross flows prior to the financial crisis. Neither advanced countries nor emerging markets have seen their level of gross flows recover to levels just prior to the global financial crisis. Figure 1 shows that net flows are very small for the aggregate of advanced countries when scaled by external assets and liabilities. This is both because advanced countries make up the largest part of the world (and world net flows are zero) and because external assets and liabilities of advanced countries are very large. Scaling by GDP, we see that emerging markets and advanced countries display opposite patterns of net flows. During the first half of the sample, up to the global financial crisis, net outflows increased in emerging markets and decreased in advanced countries. This means that capital flowed on net from emerging markets towards advanced countries. This was reversed after the crisis.

Turning now to the data for individual countries, Table 2 presents some statistics for the level and standard deviation of outflows, inflows, gross flows, and net flows (scaled both ways). The table presents the simple average, median, 25th and 75th percentiles across the groups of advanced countries and emerging markets. The ratio of the stock of external assets and liabilities to GDP is reported as well.

The level and volatility of outflows, inflows and gross flows scaled by external assets and liabilities is broadly similar in advanced countries as in emerging markets. This is not the case for net flows. When scaling by external assets and liabilities, net flows are almost 3 times as volatile in emerging markets. This is the result of the much higher ratio of external assets and liabilities to GDP in advanced countries, shown in the last row of the table. When scaling by GDP, net flows have a more similar volatility across the two groups. The standard deviation of net flows relative to GDP is 3.47 for the median advanced country versus 3.77 for the median emerging market.

Table 3 provides a first look at the global capital flows cycle. The table shows how outflows, inflows, gross flows, net flows (scaled both ways) are correlated with world gross flows. It also reports the  $R^2$  of regressions of these variables on world gross flows. Remarkably, for the median advanced country the correlation between gross flows and world gross flows is 0.7. For emerging markets the median correlation is a much weaker 0.22. The  $R^2$  of a regression of gross flows on world gross flows is simply the square of this correlation. It tells us that for the median advanced country a very large 50 percent of the variance of gross capital flows can be explained by world gross flows. For the median emerging market only 12 percent of the variance of gross capital flows can be explained by world gross flows.

So half of the variance of gross flows of the median advanced country can be explained by global gross flows. This is significantly larger than in Cerutti et.al. (2017). The main differences are that they use quarterly data and components of capital flows. When we use quarterly data over our same sample, the median  $R^2$  drops to 0.28 for advanced countries. If in addition we consider the components of capital flows, the median drops further to 0.10 (FDI), 0.15 (portfolio flows) and 0.18 (banking flows).

Table 3 also provides some information about the impact of the world gross capital flows

cycle on net flows. One should keep in mind that world net flows are by construction zero. So the sign of the correlation with world gross flows will necessarily vary across countries. If an increase in world gross flows leads to a rise in net outflows of some countries, it must necessarily lead to a drop in net outflows of other countries. It is therefore not surprising that the average correlation between net flows (scaled both ways) and world gross flows is close to zero for both advanced countries and emerging markets. More interesting is the variation across countries, which is considerable, indicating that changes in world gross flows are associated substantial changes in net flows as well. This can be seen by looking at the 25th and 75th percentiles in Table 3. For example, the correlation of net flows scaled by GDP with world gross flows varies from -0.28 to 0.29 for the middle half of advanced countries and from -0.21 to 0.42 for the middle half of emerging markets.

Figures 2 and 3 show for gross and net flows (scaled both ways) the correlation with world gross flows for each of the countries. Advanced countries are colored red, while emerging markets are colored blue. The highest correlations of gross flows with world gross flows are seen in advanced countries and the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). Ten countries have a negative correlation of gross flows with world gross flows. These are all emerging markets. For net flows, scaled both ways, about half of the countries have a positive correlation and half have a negative correlation (Figure 3). This is the case for both advanced countries and emerging markets. The absolute size of these correlations is not systematically different between advanced countries and emerging markets.

These correlations are substantial. For countries with a positive correlation (including most Latin American countries and India, China, Russia), the average is 0.36. For countries with a negative correlation (including Eastern and Southern European countries, and the US), the average is -0.31.

### 4 Factor Analysis

In the last section we simply defined the global capital flows cycle as world gross flows. We saw that world gross flows are highly correlated with gross flows of many individual countries, but also with net flows of many countries. In this section, instead of simply defining the global capital flows cycle as world gross flows, we will identify global factors that are drivers of capital inflows and outflows. We will then analyze the impact of these global factors on both gross and net flows of individual countries. We first describe the static factor model that we will use and the selection of the number of factors. After that we discuss the nature of the global factors that we identify, which we tie to the global financial cycle and the commodity price cycle. In the next section we discuss the impact of the global factors on gross and net capital flows of individual countries.

### 4.1 Static Factor Model

For now we write the model with a general number k factors:

$$of_{i,t} = \mu_i^{out} + F_t \lambda_i^{out} + \epsilon_{i,t}^{out}$$

$$if_{i,t} = \mu_i^{in} + F_t \lambda_i^{in} + \epsilon_{i,t}^{in}$$
(3)

where  $\lambda_i^{out}$  is a  $k \times 1$  vector of factor loadings and  $F_t$  is a  $1 \times k$  vector of global factors.

Note that unlike the Barrot and Serven (2018) and Cerutti et al. (2017), the vector of factors  $F_t$  is common to both outflows and inflows. This has the advantage that we can analyze the impact of the global factors on both gross and net flows. Also, in contrast to other factor models for capital flows, we do not include factors that are specific to certain groups of countries such as advanced countries, emerging markets or groups identified by region. If there is an important capital flow driver for a specific group of countries, it will generally contribute to net capital flows of that group. But this corresponds to opposite net capital flows of other groups of countries, so that the factor must ultimately impact other countries as well.

Define  $of_i$  and  $if_i$  as  $T \times 1$  vectors that stack the country-period scalars  $of_{i,t} - \mu_i^{out}$  and  $if_{i,t} - \mu_i^{in}$ . We can then compactly write the factor model as

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{F}\Lambda + \epsilon \tag{4}$$

where  $\mathbf{y}$  is a  $T \times 2n$  matrix that stacks the matrices  $\mathbf{y}_i = [of_i \ if_i]$  for the *n* countries side by side. A is a  $k \times 2n$  matrix that stacks the matrices  $\Lambda_i = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_i^{out} \ \lambda_i^{in} \end{bmatrix}$  side by side.  $\mathbf{F}$  is a  $T \times k$  matrix that contains the factors  $F_t$ .

Compute the variance matrix of  $\mathbf{y}$ ,  $\mathbf{V} = \mathbf{y}'\mathbf{y}$ :

$$\mathbf{V} = \Lambda' \mathbf{F}' \mathbf{F} \Lambda + \epsilon' \epsilon \tag{5}$$

Through an eigenvalue decomposition of the matrix  $\mathbf{V}$  we can identify the diagonal matrix of 2n eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors. The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the error terms,  $\epsilon'\epsilon$ , should be small and bounded. The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of our factors and loadings,  $\Lambda' \mathbf{F}' \mathbf{F} \Lambda$ , should be large. We choose the eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues, and those are our  $k \times 2n$  matrix  $\Lambda$ .

The factor analysis gives us a  $k \times 2n$  matrix of loadings of capital inflows and outflows in the *n* countries on the *k* factors. The eigenvalue decomposition does not identity the factors themselves, only their variance. To identify the factors, go back to the earlier equation for the  $T \times 2n$  matrix of capital flows, y:

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{F}\Lambda + \epsilon \tag{6}$$

With OLS we we can regress the  $1 \times 2n$  vector of capital inflows and outflows in period t on the matrix of loadings  $\Lambda$  to estimate the values of the k factors in period t.

We use the Bai and Ng (2002) info criterion for factor selection to select the number of factors k. Choi and Leong (2018) replicate the Monte Carlo simulations in the original Bai and Ng paper for small samples (when using annual data, there are 2n = 116 crosssectional observations and T = 20 time-series observations, when replicating the results using quarterly data there are 2n = 100 cross-sectional observations and T = 80 time-series observations). From Bai and Ng (2002), the Bayesian info criterion is given by:

$$BIC(k) = R(k) + k\sigma^2 \left(\frac{(2n+T-k)\ln(2nT)}{2nT}\right)$$
(7)

where R is the average share of the variance of each of the 2n observed series in  $\mathbf{F}$  that is left unexplained by the factor model with k factors. Thus  $R(k) = \frac{tr(\epsilon'\epsilon)}{2n}$  where  $tr(\epsilon'\epsilon)$  is the trace of the matrix of residuals from the factor model estimation in equation (5) with kfactors, and  $\sigma^2$  is the value of R(k) at our maximum number of factors. For the latter we use k = 4, so  $\sigma^2 = R(4)$ .

The logic behind this info criterion is similar to the logic behind the Akaike Info Criterion and Swartz Info Criterion used for lag length selection in time-series models. As the number of factors increases, R(k) falls, and R(k) = 0 when k = 2n. But while the explanatory power of the factor model increases as k increases, the efficiency falls, and the estimates of factors and loadings become less precise as k increases. The second term in the info criterion, also called the penalty function, tries to capture this loss in efficiency. So as k increases, the first term in these two info criterion falls but the second term increases. The optimal number of factors is the value of k where the info criterion is minimized.

### 4.2 Results from Factor Model Estimation

Table 4 reports the Bai and Ng (2002) info criterion for different k. The table shows that the first factor can explain on average about 36% of the time-series variance  $(1 - \frac{8.60}{13.31})$ . The criterion *BIC*(k) is minimized when k = 2. The first two factors explain a little more than one-half of the total variance of outflows and inflows.<sup>10</sup>

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ In factor models, the loadings and estimates of the first and second factors are not affected by the choice of k. This is in contrast to lag length selection in time-series models, where the entire estimation is affected by the lag length selection.

A time series plot of the two global factors is presented in Figure 4. The top chart shows the first factor, while the bottom chart shows the second factor, both in blue. The two factors are orthogonal, have a zero mean and standard deviation of 1. To help interpret the factors, we also show one additional series in both charts. In the top chart we show the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) factor that captures the commonality in 858 asset price series. We refer to it as the MAR factor from hereon. Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) report it at the monthly frequency. We first normalize their monthly factor to have a standard deviation and mean of respectively 1 and 0, and then annualize by taking the average over a year. In the lower chart we show both the second factor and a series that is the average of crude oil and natural gas prices.

The first factor is closely connected to the MAR factor, with a correlation of 0.82. This is the case even though the MAR factor is derived from completely different data (daily asset price data) and based on a different methodology (dynamic factor model). The second factor closely tracks the average of world oil and gas prices, with a correlation between the series of 0.89. It should also be noted that the MAR factor, while highly correlated with our first factor, is almost uncorrelated with our second factor (correlation of -0.02). Similarly, the oil and gas price, while highly correlated with the second factor, has a correlation of -0.12 with the first factor.

We will also refer to the first global capital flows factor as the GFC factor. The MAR factor is meant to be a measure of the global financial cycle, which MAR interpret as reflecting time-varying global risk aversion.<sup>11</sup> They show that in turn it is strongly influenced by US monetary policy, with a tightening of US monetary policy leading to a drop in the MAR factor. The high correlation of our first global capital flows factor with the MAR factor suggests that it is closely connected with the global financial cycle. Moreover, consistent with the strong role of US monetary policy identified by MAR as a driver of the MAR factor, our first capital flows factor has a correlation of 0.85 with the US Federal Funds rate. We will similarly also refer to the second global capital flows factor as the commodity price factor because of its close connection to oil and gas prices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>It should be said that from a theoretical point of view it is not at all obvious how a global change in risk or risk-aversion would lead to to a global change in capital flows. In fact, in a simple mean-variance portfolio framework a global rise in risk-aversion would lead to an increase in equilibrium expected excess returns on risky assets that leaves equilibrium portfolios unchanged and therefore does not impact capital flows at all. One can complicate the basic framework by introducing higher riskyness of foreign assets through information asymmetries, as well as a cost of deviating from a target portfolio, to generate a decline in external portfolio shares during a global rise in risk-aversion. In this paper though we will not concern ourselves with theoretical mechanisms that may be behind the connection between the global financial cycle and global capital flows.

# 5 Impact of Global Capital Flow Factors on Gross and Net Capital Flows

We will first discuss the impact of the two factors on capital flows for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets. After that we consider the explanatory power for individual countries.

### 5.1 Aggregate of Advanced Countries and Emerging Markets

Figure 5 shows how much of gross and net capital flows (scaled by A + L) for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets is explained by the two factors. The blue line is the actual measure of gross or net capital flows. The red line shows how much is explained by the GFC factor, while the green line shows how much is explained by the combination of the GFC and commodity price factors. The difference between the red and green line captures the additional contribution of the commodity price factor.

Clearly, the pattern of both gross and net flows for the aggregate of both groups of countries is well explained by the two factors. The GFC factor is especially important for gross flows of advanced countries, while the commodity price factor explains most of the net flows of emerging markets. The GFC factor is also important as a driver of net flows in advanced countries, accounting for the gradual increase in net capital flows to advanced countries prior to the global financial crisis and the subsequent abrupt decline in these net inflows.

For the aggregate of advanced countries we see that virtually all of gross capital flows are fully explained by the GFC factor alone. The lower left chart shows that the GFC factor has a much weaker connection to gross capital flows of emerging markets. For emerging markets the commodity price factor is as important as the GFC factor as a driver of gross flows. The rise in oil and gas prices during the first half of the sample contributes to their rise in gross flows, while the subsequent drop in oil and gas prices helps explain the drop in gross flows.

When we look at net capital flows in the two charts to the right, two points stand out. First, the two factors combined account for a lot of the fluctuations in net capital flows, especially for emerging markets. The two factors are therefore not just drivers of gross flows. They also have an important impact on net capital flows. Second, for advanced countries the GFC factor contributes most to net flows, while for emerging markets the commodity price factor contributes most to net flows. So for the aggregate of advanced countries the global financial cycle is a key driver of both gross and net capital flows, while for the aggregate of emerging market countries the world commodity price cycle is a more important driver of net capital flows and plays an important role in gross flows as well.

### 5.2 Results for Individual Countries

So far we have discussed the impact of the two global capital flow factors on capital flows of the aggregate of the groups of advanced countries and emerging markets. We now turn to the impact on capital flows of individual countries. Consider the factor model form presented earlier in equation (4) for the  $T \times 2$  matrix of capital inflows and outflows in country *i*:

$$\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{F} \Lambda_i + \epsilon_i \tag{8}$$

where  $\mathbf{y}_i = \begin{bmatrix} f_i^{out} & f_i^{in} \end{bmatrix}$  is a  $T \times 2$  matrix,  $\Phi$  is a  $T \times k$  matrix of k factors, and  $\Lambda_i = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_i^{out} & \lambda_i^{in} \end{bmatrix}$ is a  $k \times 2$  matrix. The variance matrix of the observed capital outflows and inflows is given by  $\mathbf{y}_i'\mathbf{y}_i$ . The variance matrix of the fitted capital outflows and inflows is given by  $(\mathbf{F}\Lambda_i)'(\mathbf{F}\Lambda_i)$ . The goodness of fit of gross flows can be found by pre-multiplying each of these by by  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ and post multiplying by  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}'$ , so that

$$R_{gross}^{2} = \frac{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} (\mathbf{F}\Lambda_{i})' (\mathbf{F}\Lambda_{i}) \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}'}{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{y}_{i}' \mathbf{y}_{i} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}'}$$

Analogously, the goodness of fit of net flows can be found by pre and post-multiplying by  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$  and  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix}'$ .

Since by construction, the variance matrix of the factors,  $\mathbf{F'F}$ , is simply the identity matrix, the goodness of fit of factor j in explaining gross flows in country i is  $(\lambda_{j,i}^{out} + \lambda_{j,i}^{in})^2$  divided by the observed variance of gross flows in country i. The goodness of fit of factor j in explaining net flows in country i is  $(\lambda_{j,i}^{out} - \lambda_{j,i}^{in})^2$  divided by the observed variance of net flows in country i.

Table 5 reports the average fraction of the variance of outflows, inflows, gross flows and net flows that is explained by the two global capital flow factors. Results are shown for all countries, advanced countries and emerging markets.

There are two important takeaways from Table 5. First, the combination of the two factors can on average explain a large share of the variance of both gross flows and net flows. The two factors account for 51 and 38 percent of the variance of gross flows in the advanced economies and emerging markets, respectively. They account for 36 percent and 39 percent of the variance of net flows of advanced countries and emerging markets. The important role in explaining net capital flows, and therefore the current account, suggests that these global factors may have an important effect on business cycles. In most open economy macro models net flows are driven by asymmetric shocks across countries, while global shocks have no effect on net capital flows.<sup>12</sup> But once allowing for various types of heterogeneity across countries, global shocks can have a significant effect on net capital flows. Our two global

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>See for example Glick and Rogoff (1995) or Davis and van Wincoop (2018) for a more recent model.

factors account for close to forty percent of the variance of net flows for the average country in the sample.

A second takeaway from Table 5 relates to the relative importance of the two factors. Overall, for the entire set of countries, the GFC factor is the dominant driver of gross capital flows, while the commodity price factor is an equally important driver of net capital flows. Within advanced countries the GFC factor is clearly most important, especially for gross flows but also for net flows. Within emerging markets the two factors are about equally important, with the GFC factor being somewhat more important for gross flows and the commodity price factor somewhat more important for net flows.

The fact that net flows are significantly affected by the two global factors implies substantial heterogeneity across the countries, which is reflected in the heterogeneity of the factor loadings. This heterogeneity of factor loadings in turn translates into heterogeneity in the contribution of the two factors to the variance of gross and net flows. The fraction of the variance that can be explained by both factors is reported for each country in Figures 6 and 7 for respectively gross flows and net flows. The countries in red are the advanced countries, while the countries in blue are the emerging markets. The left chart of Figure 6 shows that the GFC factor is most important for advanced countries and Eastern European countries as a driver of gross flows. But there is significant heterogeneity within both groups of countries. In Iceland over 80 percent of the variance of gross flows is explained by the GFC factor. In the US it is over 70 percent. By contrast, in Canada, another advanced country, virtually none of the variance of gross flows is explained by the GFC factor. In Japan less than 10 percent is explained by the GFC factor. The chart on the right hand side of Figure 6 shows similar heterogeneity for the commodity price factor. Overall this is a more important driver of gross flows for emerging markets. But while in countries like Thailand and Indonesia it accounts for close to 60 percent of the variance of gross flows, in two thirds of the emerging markets it accounts for less than 10 percent of the variance of gross flows.

Similar heterogeneity applies when we look at the contribution of both factors to the variance of net flows, reported in Figure 7. While in Canada 65 percent of the variance of net flows is explained by the GFC factor, in other advanced countries like Italy, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands virtually non of the variance of net flows is explained by the GFC factor. With regards to the commodity price factors we see that in emerging markets like Bolivia, Brazil and Fiji well over 60 percent of the variance of net capital flows is explained by the commodity price factor, while in others like Indonesia, Uruguay, Honduras and South Africa virtually none of the variance of net flows is explained by the commodity price factor.

## 6 Explaining the Heterogeneity of the Factor Loadings

The results from Figures 6 and 7 suggest that there are important types of heterogeneity across the countries that lead to large differences in factor loadings. The actual factor loadings for individual countries are reported in Tables 6 (advanced countries) and 7 (emerging markets). Statistical significance is reported as well. In this section we will make an attempt to see what types of differences across countries lead to systematic differences in factor loadings. This can potentially have important policy implications. There is generally little that countries can do to influence the two global factors, but they can certainly take measures to influence their exposure to these factors.

We should emphasize though that the heterogeneity of the factor loadings reported in Tables 6 and 7 is to some extent caused by measurement error. So some of these differences are not real and we should not expect to account for all of the heterogeneity in estimated factor loadings. Related to this, many of the factor loadings are not statistically significant. If we look at all countries, the GFC factor is statistically significant in 59 percent of the countries for gross flows and 41 percent for net flows. The commodity price factor is significant in 40 percent of the countries for gross flows and 47 percent for net flows.

### 6.1 Heterogeneity GFC Factor Loadings

We will first discuss the loadings for the GFC factor. Tables 8 and 9 report results from regressions of the outflow loading  $\lambda_1^{out}$ , the inflow loading  $\lambda_1^{in}$ , the gross flow loading  $\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$  and the net flow loading  $\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$  on a variety of country-specific variables. For each country, we use the average of each variable over the entire sample. It should be emphasized that these two tables only consider a limited set of dependent variables. We have considered many more variables that we will discuss in Section 6.3 below, but these other variables are generally not statistically significant. Therefore we believe that the main sources of heterogeneity of the factor loadings for the GFC factor are shown in Tables 8 and 9. Overall the explanatory variables yield an adjusted  $R^2$  of 65 percent for gross flows and 44 percent for net flows (columns 5 and 7 of Table 9).

In Table 8 we report the results of regressions on two sets of variables. These sets only differ in the way we treat external assets and liabilities. In the first set we regress on both external assets plus liabilities relative to GDP, (A + L)/GDP, and external assets minus liabilities relative to GDP, (A - L)/GDP. These are respectively a measure of financial integration and a measure of net external lending (net borrowing when negative). In the second set of variables we separately include both (A + L)/GDP and (A - L)/GDP for net lenders (A > L) and net debtors (A < L). The remaining variables are the same for both regressions. There are three policy variables: capital controls, inflation and the fraction of years that the country had a fixed exchange rate system. There are two trade variables: exports plus imports relative to GDP (a measure of trade integration) and exports minus imports (the trade account) relative to GDP. The other variables are per capita GDP, an Eastern European dummy and a Latin American dummy. Dummies for other regions (Western Europe, Asia-Pacific and other) are not statistically significant and not included.

Table 9 is analogous to Table 8, except that we break down A + L and A - L into three components: debt (banking and portfolio debt), portfolio equity and FDI. We also report results when we include the gross and net positions for debt,  $(A + L)^{debt}$  and  $(A - L)^{debt}$ , separately for countries that are net lenders in debt assets and net borrowers in debt assets. It should be pointed out that on average 72 percent of debt assets and liabilities are banking assets and liabilities.

In what follows one should keep in mind that the average capital outflow, inflow and gross flow loadings are positive, while the average net flow loading is close to zero. A positive coefficient of a variable for the outflow, inflow and gross flow loadings therefore implies that a higher value of the variable makes the country more sensitive to the global financial cycle. A positive value for the net flow loading implies that a higher value of the variable raises net outflows when the GFC factor improves.

The measure of financial integration in Table 8, (A + L)/GDP, is strongly significant for the outflow and gross flow loading, but not for the inflow and net flow loading. Moreover, this significance comes entirely from countries that are net debtors. The positive coefficient implies that net debtor countries that are more financially integrated tend to be more sensitive to the GFC factor. The net foreign asset position A - L is always strongly significant. Moreover, this is again a result of countries that have a net external debt. It is insignificant for countries that are net creditors. A larger net external debt L - A implies that outflows, inflows and gross flows are more sensitive to the GFC factor, while net outflows will rise more when the GFC factor deteriorates. The latter implies that the larger the net external debt of a country, the more net borrowing declines when the GFC factor deteriorates, as during the global financial crisis.

The results in Table 9 confirm these findings and show that they are fully the result of the exposure to debt assets and liabilities. Gross and net exposures to portfolio equity and FDI do not affect the sensitivity of capital flows to the GFC factor. Exposure to debt assets and liabilities do, but only if a country is a net borrower in debt assets. For those countries, larger net liabilities in debt assets lead to increased sensitivity of capital outflows, inflows and gross flows to the GFC factor. In addition, the larger the net liabilities in debt assets, the larger the decline in net borrowing when the GFC factor deteriorates. Table 9 shows that countries with a larger gross position in debt assets are also more exposed to the GFC factor. This again only applies to countries that have positive net liabilities in debt assets.

In order to provide a quantitative perspective of the impact of net debt liabilities on factor loadings, Table 10 splits the sample into three groups: 16 countries that are net creditors in debt assets, 23 countries that have small net debt liabilities of less than 20 percent of GDP, and 19 countries that have large net debt liabilities that are bigger than 20 percent of GDP. It is this last group that is most exposed to the global financial cycle. Their average gross factor loading is 3.87, which is about double that of the net creditor and small net debt countries. Their average net factor loading is -0.71, versus only -0.13 for the small net debt countries. Now consider what would happen if these countries managed to eliminate their net debt liabilities. Using the coefficients on  $(A - L)^{debt}(-)$  in Table 9 for the gross and net factor loadings, respectively -3.16 and 1.31, we can compute the new average factor loadings if the net debt were eliminated. The average net debt for this group is 49 percent of GDP. Bringing this to zero, the gross factor loading would drop from 3.87 to 2.32, while the net factor loading would change from -0.71 to -0.07. These are very large changes. Net capital flows would be very little affected by the GFC factor, in line with the small net debt countries. Even gross capital flows would be far less affected, similar to creditor countries and small net debt countries.

These results are also consistent with those reported in Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), although they focus on the period of the global financial crisis and use a different methodology. They regress the annualized change in capital inflows and outflows from the pre-crisis period 2006Q1-2007Q2 to the crisis period 2008Q4-2009Q1 (relative to either GDP or A+L) on a variety of variables. A key finding is that the decline in both inflows and outflows is larger the bigger the net liabilities in debt assets and the larger gross banking assets. They do not distinguish between net debtors and creditors.

The results so far have clear policy implications. If a country wishes to reduce its exposure to the GFC factor, it should limit the size of its net debt liabilities. Since most of these involve net banking liabilities, banking sector regulation is critical. A related policy question relates to the dilemma introduced by Rey (2013), who argues that with a strong global financial cycle countries need to choose between monetary autonomy and international financial integration. We find that what matters is not financial integration overall, but rather net debt liabilities. As we will see in a moment, capital controls are not statistically significant in accounting for the heterogeneity in factor loadings.

The large loading on net debt liabilities makes theoretical sense. When a country has significant net external debt, and borrowing constraints are tightened during the deterioration of the GFC factor, it experiences a decline in net borrowing. Borrowing constraints naturally apply to debt, not to equity and FDI. This explains the importance of net debt liabilities for the net factor loading and the capital inflow loading.

The role of gross A + L positions is of interest as well. Davis and van Wincoop (2018)

find in a two-country model that the impact of global shocks on gross capital flows, scaled by A + L, does not depend on the extent of financial integration, measured by (A + L)/GDP. The logic behind this is that a shock that decreases external assets and liabilities by 10 percent will lower gross flows by 0.1(A + L) in levels, but by 0.1 when scaled by A + L. The size of (A + L)/GDP is irrelevant. The larger the assets and liabilities, the larger the corresponding flows as well. The only reason gross positions matter for gross flows in Tables 8 and 9 is because of gross debt positions. We know from Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) that they declined disproportionately during the global financial crisis. For a given  $(A - L)^{debt}$ , a higher level of  $(A + L)^{debt}$  implies a higher value of both  $A^{debt}$  and  $L^{debt}$ . This means that there are larger debt assets and liabilities to reverse when creditors in all countries tighten borrowing constraints. This leads to a larger scale decline in both debt inflows and outflows, without affecting net flows.

Finally consider the other variables in Tables 8 and 9. Capital controls have no explanatory power for both the gross factor loading and the net factor loading. This suggests that simply imposing larger capital controls to mitigate the exposure to global capital flow drivers will generally not be helpful. Inflation matters most for the net factor loading. The results imply that countries with higher inflation see a larger decline in net outflows (or increase in net inflows) when the GFC factor deteriorates. An explanation for this may be that during a period of deterioration of the global financial cycle, investors become relatively more concerned with risks associated with financial institutions (e.g. leverage) and therefore become relatively less concerned with inflation. This can lead to higher net flows to countries with relatively high inflation. Finally, an exchange rate peg tends to increase the sensitivity of gross flows, but not net flows, to the GFC factor. Giving up monetary autonomy will therefore not lead to larger volatility of net capital flows that may increase business cycle volatility.

The trade variables are sometimes marginally significant, but this is not robust. Once we include gross and net positions in debt assets for countries with positive net liabilities in debt assets (the sixth and eighth columns of Table 9), both gross and net factor loadings do not depend on X + M or X - M as a fraction of GDP. Per capita GDP has an effect on gross factor loadings, but not on net factor loadings. The results imply that gross flows to poorer countries are less exposed to the GFC factor, while economic development has little effect on the exposure of net flows to the GFC factor. The only regional dummy variables that are significant are the Eastern European dummy and the Latin America dummy. Particularly the Eastern European dummy is important. These countries tend to be more sensitive to the GFC factor. Many of these countries had net debt liabilities, which affected them as well. But it does not fully explain the amplified impact of the GFC factor on the Eastern European countries.

### 6.2 Heterogeneity of Commodity Price Factor Loadings

Table 11 reports results to account for the heterogeneity of the factor loadings associated with the commodity price factor. We regress on four fuel related variables. The first two are exports and imports of fuel as a share of GDP. The third one is crude oil consumption as a fraction of GDP, while the last is crude oil production as a fraction of GDP. The main effect of these variables is on the net factor loading. Higher fuel exports leads to higher net capital outflows when the commodity price factor rises. This makes sense as some of the additional revenue when fuel prices rise will be invested abroad or used to borrow less abroad. The latter appears most relevant as inflows drop, while the effect on outflows is not statistically significant. Crude oil consumption plays a role as well. A country that consumes more crude oil as a fraction of GDP has a larger capital inflow loading. This means that when oil prices rise, there will be higher capital inflows. There will also be higher net capital inflows as the net factor loading is significant.

We also include the same variables as in the first column of Table 8. The external asset and liability variables (A + L)/GDP and (A - L)/GDP are not statistically significant. Neither are the trade variables (X + M)/GDP and (X - M)/GDP. Inflation is again significant. Higher inflation countries experience larger capital inflows, as well as net inflows, when oil prices rise. We also see that Eastern Europe and Latin America experience a larger increase in net capital inflows when oil prices rise. Overall though, the fuel variables are most important in explaining the heterogeneity of the net factor loading, as one would expect. They raise the adjusted  $R^2$  from 14 percent to 33 percent for the net factor loading.

### 6.3 Additional Explanatory Variables

We have considered a substantial number of additional explanatory variables by adding variables, one at a time, to the regressions in columns 5 and 7 of Table 9 and columns 6 and 8 of Table 11. The results are shown in Table 12, where we report the estimated coefficient for that variable, its standard error and the overall adjusted  $R^2$  of the regression. The extra explanatory variables we consider are: a measure of the strength of institutions, a measure of a country's credit rating, an index of financial development, a country's average merchandise tariff rate, the average government budget deficit, the corporate tax rate, an index of press freedom, the secondary school attainment rate, a Western Europe dummy, an Asia dummy, a measure of the growth of private domestic credit, the stock of central bank foreign exchange reserves, a measure of bank soundness, and the previous measure of capital controls squared. We include the latter in order to check for possible non-linearity associated with the effect of capital controls. All of these variables and their sources are described in detail in the data appendix.

Most variables have no effect. The secondary school attainment rate and the growth in private sector credit have an effect on the gross loadings for the first factor, but they do not have a significant effect on net loadings. Similarly, press freedom, the stock of foreign exchange reserves, and bank soundness have a significant effect on gross loadings for the second factor, but do not have significant effects on net loadings or gross loadings for the GFC factor. Finally, the squared capital controls variable also has no explanatory power. This suggests that even large capital controls will not necessarily weaken exposure to global capital flow drivers.

# 7 Sensitivity Analysys: Quarterly Data

In the Online Appendix we replicate all tables and figures using quarterly data over the same 20 years. We find that the results do not change qualitatively, but do change quantitatively.

The results remain qualitative similar in several ways. First, we continue to find that there are two main global factors driving capital flows, that the first factor is highly correlated with the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey global financial cycle factor and the second is highly correlated with the average of crude oil and natural gas prices. Second, we continue to find that for the entire set of countries the GFC factor is the dominant driver of gross capital flows, while the two factors are equally important drivers of net capital flows. Within advanced countries the GFC factor remains most important, especially for gross flows but also for net flows. Within emerging markets the two factors are about equally important, with the GFC factor being somewhat more important for gross flows and the commodity price factor somewhat more important for net flows. Finally, the key findings with regards to the drivers of the heterogeneity of factor loadings continue to hold up as well.

But quantitatively, the two factors explain a much smaller share of the variance of capital flows when using quarterly data. This is the result of the higher degree of measurement error in quarterly capital flow data. The increased noise weakens the common component. In Table 5 we report that these two global factors on average explain about 40 percent of the variance of gross and net capital flows when calculated using annual data. When using quarterly data, the two factors explain around 25 percent of the variance of gross and net capital flows.

# 8 Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, the size of external assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP has grown enormously in many countries, especially in advanced countries. The volatility of gross capital flows has correspondingly increased as well. Concerns about a sudden unwinding of these large gross positions, together with the sudden sharp retrenchment of capital inflows and outflows during the global financial crisis, have lead to a refocus of the literature away from net international capital flows to gross capital flows. While capital inflows and outflows have become a lot more volatile, net capital flows have not. This reflects the increasing co-movement between capital inflows and outflows, especially in advanced countries. To the extent that inflows and outflows move in lockstep, they do not affect net capital flows. They may therefore not be of concern to policy makers as it is primarily net capital flows that impact the real economy by financing consumption and investment. However, as we have documented here, gross flows and net flows are in fact closely connected to each other. Global drivers of gross flows also have a significant effect on net capital flows.

In order to consider the joint impact of global drivers on both gross and net capital flows, we have estimated a factor model for 58 countries. We have identified two global factors, the GFC factor and the commodity price factor. The former is closely connected to the global financial cycle, which in turn is closely related to changes in global perceptions of risk and risk-aversion, while the latter is closely associated with oil and gas prices. We find that these factors not only have significant explanatory power for gross capital flows, but also for net capital flows. For the average country, forty percent of the variance of net capital flows is explained by these two global factors, with the GFC factor contributing equally to net capital flow volatility as the commodity price factor. The large impact of these global factors on net capital flows reflects various types of heterogeneity across countries. This heterogeneity is rather obvious for commodity price shocks as the extent of fuel exports and consumption naturally varies across countries. But it also applies to global risk shocks that drive the global financial cycle as countries have different exposures to financial sector risks. Mitigating these exposures is a natural objective for policy makers to limit the impact of global shocks on their real economies.

In order to shed light on the heterogeneity across countries in the sensitivity of capital flows to the global factors, we have regressed the factor loadings on a wide set of variables related to trade and financial integration, macroeconomic policy and conditions, institutional quality, financial development, exchange rate system and regulation. We find that most variables do not have significant explanatory power. But a key finding is that critical variables in accounting for the heterogeneous gross and net capital flows loadings for the GFC factor are debt assets plus liabilities and net debt liabilities. Moreover, this sensitivity only applies to countries with positive net debt liabilities (not to net creditors). Exposure to other asset classes (portfolio equity and FDI) does not play a significant role. Global changes in risk and risk perceptions can lead to a cycle of tightening and softening of credit constraints that specifically impact countries with positive net debt liabilities. Larger net debt liabilities lead to a larger decline in net capital inflows during a risk off period. Several policy lessons can be drawn from our analysis. First, reducing exposure to external financial sector risks, particularly in the form of large net external debt liabilities, will limit the impact of the global financial cycle on net capital flows. Financial sector regulation, especially bank regulation, is therefore an effective way to limit exposure to the global financial cycle. Second, most other policy variables, such as capital controls, the exchange rate system, fiscal policy and reserve accumulation, do not limit the impact of the global financial cycle on net capital flows. These findings also provide a different perspective on the debate regarding trade-offs between monetary autonomy and financial integration initiated by Rey (2013). Weakening exposure to the global financial cycle, thus allowing monetary authorities to re-focus on traditional concerns about inflation, is not necessarily achieved through capital controls. Instead, financial sector regulation that limits exposure to net debt liabilities is a more effective way to insulate net capital flows from the global risk-on, risk-off cycle.

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# A Data Appendix

There are two types of data we consider. The capital flow data is used as a time series, and we construct a balanced panel of annual or quarterly capital flow data over the 1996-2015 period for the 58 countries in the annual sample or the 50 countries in the quarterly sample

The explanatory variables that we consider when looking at heterogeneity across the loadings is constructed as cross-sectional, not time-series data. If the data is available in the time series we take the average of this data over the 1996-2015 period to construct country-specific observations of each variable.

### A.1 Data collected as a time-series

Capital outflows and inflows, *OF* and *IF*: Collected from the IMF International Financial Statistics Balance of Payments data, BPM6. The capital inflows and outflows are then normalized by the stock of external assets and liabilities, which are also collected from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, International Investment Position, BPM6. The one exception to this is in Section 3 we also present results after normalizing net flows by GDP. When estimating the factor model, all flows are normalized by external assets and liabilities.

Both the Balance of Payments and International Investment position data are disaggregated into FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, other (which mainly consists of bank lending), and official reserve asset accumulation (only part of capital outflows or assets). Only in Section 3 do we briefly report statistics about the subcomponents of capital flows, in the rest of the paper all subcomponents of capital flows are aggregated into total capital outflows and inflows. When examining heterogeneity across factor loadings we do consider the International Investment Position data divided into its subcomponents (to be discussed later in this appendix).

Miranda-Agrippino and Rey Global Financial Cycle factor: This MAR factor is only used when plotted in Figure 4 alongside our first factor. We plot the MAR factor (from the short series) after normalizing the factor to have a mean zero and a standard deviation one, and then taking the average factor over each year.

**Oil/Gas price:** This oil/gas price is only used when plotted in Figure 4 alongside our second factor. The plotted series is the average of the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price and the Henry Hub Natural Gas price, where both series have been normalized to have a mean zero and a standard deviation one.

### A.2 Data collected in cross-section only

These data series are used in the Section 6 as explanatory variables to explain the crosssectional heterogeneity of the estimated factor loadings.

External Assets and Liabilities: This is collected from the IMF International Financial Statistics, International Investment Position, BPM6. The IIP series is normalized by nominal GDP and the A and L variables in the regressions are the average values of these IIP series over the 1996-2015 period. The IIP data is disaggregated into FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and other (which mainly consists of bank lending). In Table 8 we only consider aggregate A and L, but in Table 9 we consider FDI, portfolio equity and debt (portfolio debt plus other plus central bank foreign exchange reserves) separately.

**Exports and Imports:** X and M include goods and services exports and imports and are collected from the IMF Internal Financial Statistics, Balance of Payments, BPM6.

**GDP per capita:** Nominal GDP (in USD) from IMF International Financial Statistics divided by population from the UN Population Statistics.

**Inflation:** The year-over-year percentage change in consumer prices, from the IMF International Financial Statistics.

**Regional dummy variables:** The assignment of regional dummy variables for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America is described in Table 1.

**Exchange Rate Peg:** Using the binomial exchange rate classification system from Shambaugh (2004), using his data updated through 2014, the explanatory variable *Peg* is the fraction of years over the 1996-2014 period that the country had a pegged exchange rate. We do not distinguish between soft and hard pegs.

**Fuel Exports and Imports**: Total fuel exports and fuel imports normalized by nominal GDP, from World Bank's World Development Indicators.

**Barrels of Crude Oil Production and Consumption**: Numbers of barrels per day of crude oil consumption and production, multiplied by the price per barrel of West Texas Intermediate, normalized by nominal GDP, from U.S. Energy Information Administration.

**Institutions:** Pillar One of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum. The WEF data only begin in 2007. All WEF variables are the average over the 2007-2015 period.

**Credit rating:** Entry 3.05 of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum.

**Financial Development:** Pillar Eight of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum.

**Tariffs:** Average tariff on merchandise imports, from World Bank's World Development Indicators.

Government Deficit: Entry 3.01 of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World

Economic Forum.

Press Freedom: Freedom of the press index from Freedom House.

**Secondary School:** The secondary school attainment rate from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

**Private Domestic Credit:** The year over year growth rate in private domestic credit from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

**FX Reserves:** Central bank foreign exchange reserves normalized by GDP from the IMF from International Financial Statistics, International Investment Position, BPM6.

**Bank soundness:** Entry 8.06 of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum.

Capital controls: The Chinn-Ito capital account openness index.

**Corporate tax rate:** Entry 6.05 of the Global Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum



Figure 1: Advanced and emerging market outflows, inflows, gross flows, and net flows.

Note: All capital flows are first aggregated across country groups and then normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities or normalized by the sum of GDP for that country group. 31



Figure 2: Correlation between gross flows in country i and world flows.

Note: Capital flows are normalized by external A+L. Correlations are calculated using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Countries in red are in the group of advanced countries, emerging markets are in blue.



Figure 3: Correlation between net flows in country i and world flows.

Note: Correlations are calculated using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Countries in red are in the group of advanced countries, emerging markets are in blue.



Figure 4: First and Second Global factors.





Figure 5: Observed gross and net flows, and fitted values from the factor model.

Note: Observed value is the blue line, fitted value based on the first global factor is the red line, fitted value based on the first and second global factors is the green line.



Figure 6: Contribution of the first and second factors to the observed variance of gross flows.

Note: Capital flows are normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities. Factors, loadings, and goodness of fit calculated using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Countries in red are in the group of advanced countries, emerging markets are in blue.



Figure 7: Contribution of the first and second factors to the observed variance of net flows

Note: Capital flows are normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities. Factors, loadings, and goodness of fit calculated using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Countries in red are in the group of advanced countries, emerging markets are in blue.

Advanced	Eme	rging and Developing
United States (5)	Argentina (3)	Thailand (2)
Singapore $(2)$	Armenia $(1)$	Ukraine $(4)$
Australia $(2)$	Bangladesh $(2)$	Uruguay $(3)$
Canada $(5)$	Bolivia (3)	Venezuela $(3)$
Switzerland $(1)$	Brazil $(3)$	South Africa $(5)$
Germany $(1)$	Chile $(3)$	Albania (4)
Denmark $(1)$	China $(2)$	Czech Republic (4)
Spain $(1)$	Colombia (3)	Estonia $(4)$
Finland $(1)$	Fiji (2)	Croatia (4)
France $(1)$	Honduras $(3)$	Hungary (4)
United Kingdom $(1)$	Indonesia $(2)$	Lithuania (4)
Iceland $(1)$	India (2)	Latvia $(4)$
Israel $(5)$	Jordan $(5)$	Poland $(4)$
Italy $(1)$	Moldova (4)	Romania (4)
Japan $(2)$	Mexico (3)	Slovakia (4)
Korea $(2)$	Pakistan $(2)$	Slovenia (4)
The Netherlands $(1)$	Peru (3)	Turkey $(4)$
Norway $(1)$	Philippines $(2)$	Sri Lanka (2)
Portugal (1)	Paraguay (3)	
Sweden $(1)$	Russia $(4)$	

Table 1: Countries in the sample.

Note: The numbers in parenthesis after each country name correspond to the 5 geographic regions that we consider in the multivariate regressions of the loadings. The regions are Western Europe (1), Asia-Pacific (2), Latin America (3), Eastern Europe (4) and Other (5).

	2.6		0511	75.1
	Mean	Median	25th	75th
ADV				
Level $Of_i$	3.92	3.79	3.06	4.37
Level $if_i$	3.74	3.39	3.16	4.14
$SD(of_i)$	2.91	2.69	2.11	3.16
$SD(if_i)$	3.04	2.63	2.33	3.44
$SD(gf_i)$	5.78	5.26	4.45	6.37
$SD(nf_i)$	1.23	0.88	0.65	1.21
$SD(nf_i^{gdp})$	4.15	3.47	2.16	4.05
$\frac{\underline{ExA\&L_i}}{GDP_i}$	4.65	3.64	2.19	4.67
EME				
Level $of_i$	3.26	2.96	2.31	4.68
Level $if_i$	5.34	5.36	3.81	6.34
$SD(of_i)$	3.39	3.22	2.75	4.00
$SD(if_i)$	3.94	3.72	2.65	5.07
$SD(gf_i)$	6.44	6.44	4.85	7.27
$SD(nf_i)$	3.53	3.16	2.38	4.26
$SD(nf_i^{gdp})$	4.14	3.74	2.86	5.23
$\frac{ExA\&L_i}{GDP_i}$	1.35	1.21	0.95	1.58

Table 2: Capital Flow Moments - Levels and Standard Deviations

Note: Capital flow variables  $o\overline{f_i, if_i, gf_i, and nf_i}$  are the respective capital flows normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities. The variable  $nf^{gdp}$  is net flows normalized by GDP.

	ADV											
	Correlat	tion with $g$	$f_{w}$ :		$R^2$	$R^2$ from regression on $gf_w$ :						
	Mean	Median	25th	75th		Mean	Median	$25 \mathrm{th}$	75th			
$of_i$	0.63	0.70	0.50	0.75	$of_i$	0.41	0.42	0.19	0.62			
$if_i$	0.61	0.68	0.55	0.75	$if_i$	0.44	0.47	0.30	0.57			
$gf_i$	0.64	0.70	0.57	0.76	$gf_i$	0.46	0.50	0.32	0.57			
$nf_i$	0.04	-0.03	-0.33	0.43	$nf_i$	0.17	0.18	0.06	0.26			
$nf_i^{gdp}$	0.00	0.00	-0.28	0.36	$nf_i^{gdp}$	0.12	0.11	0.02	0.20			
	EME											
	Correlat	tion with $g$	$f_{w^{:}}$		$R^2$	$R^2$ from regression on $gf_w$ :						
	Mean	Median	25th	75th		Mean	Median	25th	75th			
$of_i$	0.24	0.27	0.03	0.50	$of_i$	0.20	0.14	0.07	0.31			
$if_i$	0.19	0.15	-0.11	0.53	$if_i$	0.20	0.14	0.02	0.29			
$gf_i$	0.23	0.22	-0.04	0.54	$gf_i$	0.20	0.12	0.01	0.29			
$nf_i$	-0.03	0.08	-0.28	0.19	$nf_i$	0.13	0.05	0.02	0.21			
$n f_i^{gdp}$	0.07	0.07	-0.22	0.41	$n f_{i}^{gdp}$	0.17	0.12	0.04	0.28			

Table 3: Capital Flow Moments - Correlation with Global Flows

Note: Capital flow variables  $of_i$ ,  $if_i$ ,  $gf_i$ , and  $nf_i$  are the respective capital flows normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities. The variable  $nf^{gdp}$  is net flows normalized by GDP.

Table 4: Bai and Ng (2002) info criterion for determining the number of factors.

4	4.18	11.55
3	5.06	10.63
2	6.60	10.34
1	8.64	10.52
0	13.52	13.52
k	R(k)	$\operatorname{BIC}(k)$

Notes: The factors are computed using data over the period 1996-2015. When computing factors, capital flows are normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities.

	All	ADV	EME
Outflows			
1st Factor	0.26	0.42	0.18
2nd Factor	0.15	0.09	0.19
Residual	0.59	0.49	0.63
Inflows			
1st Factor	0.30	0.43	0.24
2nd Factor	0.12	0.07	0.15
Residual	0.57	0.49	0.61
Gross			
1st Factor	0.30	0.43	0.23
2nd Factor	0.13	0.08	0.15
Residual	0.57	0.49	0.62
Net			
1st Factor	0.18	0.21	0.17
2nd Factor	0.19	0.15	0.22
Residual	0.62	0.64	0.61

Table 5: Average share of the variance of different capital flow variables that is explained by the first or second factor.

Notes: The goodness of fit statistics are calculated from a factor model using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Capital flows normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities.

	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out}$	$\lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} + \lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} - \lambda_2^{in}$
Switzerland	1.67***	1.33***	3.00***	0.33***	-1.07**	-0.90**	-1.97**	-0.17
Germany	$1.52^{***}$	1.89***	3.41***	-0.37***	-0.91***	-1.51***	-2.41***	0.60***
Denmark	1.99***	$2.06^{***}$	4.05***	-0.07	-0.18	-0.54	-0.72	0.37
Spain	2.15***	$2.64^{***}$	4.80***	-0.49**	-1.47***	-0.82**	-2.29***	-0.65***
Finland	$1.26^{**}$	0.47	1.73	0.79***	-1.07*	-0.51	-1.58	-0.56***
France	2.19***	$1.91^{***}$	4.09***	0.28***	-0.32	0.18	-0.14	-0.49***
UK	$3.19^{***}$	$3.16^{***}$	6.35***	0.04	-0.38	-0.22	-0.60	-0.15*
Iceland	7.29***	9.25***	$16.54^{***}$	-1.96***	1.05	-0.18	0.87	$1.24^{*}$
Italy	1.77***	1.71***	3.47***	0.06	-1.03***	-0.59**	-1.62***	-0.44**
Netherlands	$1.76^{***}$	$1.80^{***}$	$3.56^{***}$	-0.05	-0.93***	-0.89***	-1.82***	-0.04
Norway	$2.84^{***}$	$2.45^{***}$	5.30***	0.39	0.02	-0.43	-0.41	0.46
Portugal	1.99***	$2.66^{***}$	4.65***	-0.67***	-1.55***	-1.71***	-3.27***	0.16
Sweden	$1.52^{***}$	1.33***	2.85***	0.18	-0.79**	-0.94**	-1.73**	0.15
Singapore	$1.89^{**}$	$1.73^{**}$	3.62**	0.15	-0.26	-0.13	-0.39	-0.12
Australia	0.00	$0.35^{*}$	0.36	-0.35***	0.13	0.08	0.22	0.05
Japan	0.70**	0.21	0.91	0.50***	0.66**	0.73**	1.39**	-0.08
Korea	0.64	1.70**	2.34*	-1.06	-0.15	-0.08	-0.23	-0.07
USA	$1.16^{***}$	1.71***	2.87***	-0.56***	-0.25	-0.08	-0.33	-0.16
Canada	0.44**	-0.18	0.25	0.62***	0.08	0.05	0.12	0.03
Israel	0.98***	1.50***	2.48***	-0.52	0.55	-0.77*	-0.23	1.32***

Table 6: Advanced economy factor loadings.

Note: \*\*\*/\*\*/\* denotes significance at the 1/5/10% level.

	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out}$	$\lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} + \lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} - \lambda_2^{in}$
Armenia	0.76	2.18*	2.93**	-1.42	2.04***	-1.48	0.56	3.52**
Moldova	0.12	0.75	0.87	-0.63	3.23***	2.29***	5.52***	0.94
Russia	2.35***	1.62**	3.97***	0.74	2.32***	1.04	3.36***	$1.28^{*}$
Ukraine	4.53***	3.59***	8.12***	0.93	4.36***	3.79***	8.16***	0.57
Albania	0.65	-0.76	-0.11	$1.40^{*}$	-1.44*	0.97	-0.48	-2.41***
Czech Republic	0.79**	2.03***	2.82***	-1.24***	-0.08	-0.76**	-0.84	$0.68^{*}$
Estonia	$2.51^{***}$	$5.64^{***}$	8.15***	-3.14***	-0.18	-1.49**	-1.68	1.31***
Croatia	1.03**	3.92***	4.95***	-2.90***	-0.13	-1.83***	-1.96*	1.70***
Hungary	1.94***	3.81***	5.75***	-1.86***	1.38**	0.47	1.85	0.90***
Lithuania	$1.63^{***}$	5.83***	7.46***	-4.20***	0.38	-1.93***	-1.55	2.31***
Latvia	2.78***	6.11***	8.89***	-3.33***	0.11	0.14	0.25	-0.03
Poland	0.73	1.49**	2.23**	-0.76*	0.54	-0.09	0.45	0.63
Romania	2.02***	4.77***	6.79***	-2.75***	1.40**	2.38***	3.78***	-0.98
Slovakia	0.81	2.32***	$3.13^{*}$	-1.51***	0.50	-0.61	-0.11	1.11**
Slovenia	$2.64^{***}$	3.09***	5.73***	-0.45	0.26	0.89*	1.14	-0.63
Turkey	$1.38^{***}$	0.78	$2.16^{*}$	0.60	0.45	2.53***	2.98**	-2.08***
Bangladesh	-1.07	-1.06***	-2.13***	0.00	-0.12	0.86***	0.73	-0.98
China	2.78***	1.70***	4.48***	1.08**	2.19***	-0.33	1.87**	2.52***
Fiji	-1.28**	-1.02	-2.30**	-0.26	0.14	4.54***	4.67***	-4.40***
Indonesia	-0.59	-1.71***	-2.30***	1.11*	2.10***	2.24***	4.34***	-0.14
India	0.89**	-0.90*	-0.02	1.79***	0.44	0.03	0.48	0.41
Pakistan	-0.14	0.12	-0.02	-0.27	0.77	3.01***	3.78***	-2.24*
Philippines	-0.25	0.97	0.72	-1.22*	1.80**	-0.59	1.21	2.39***
Thailand	-0.86	-0.39	-1.25	-0.47	2.81***	3.16***	5.97***	-0.36
Sri Lanka	-0.31	-0.87	-1.18	0.55	-2.13***	-0.74	-2.87**	-1.38**
Argentina	0.67	0.20	0.87	0.48	0.76	-0.93	-0.16	1.69***
Bolivia	-0.95	-1.86**	-2.81**	0.91	3.00***	-3.21***	-0.21	6.20***
Brazil	0.03	-0.61	-0.58	$0.63^{*}$	2.59***	0.30	2.88***	2.29***
Chile	0.46	0.19	0.65	0.26	0.53	-0.63	-0.10	1.15***
Colombia	0.23	-0.08	0.14	0.31	$0.81^{*}$	0.32	1.13	0.49
Honduras	0.37	-1.49**	-1.12	1.86***	0.48	0.15	0.64	0.33
Mexico	-0.10	-0.24	-0.34	0.14	$0.54^{*}$	-0.06	0.48	0.59***
Peru	0.09	-0.58	-0.49	$0.66^{*}$	2.11***	0.49	2.61***	$1.62^{***}$
Paraguay	-0.91***	0.28	-0.63*	-1.19***	0.73***	-0.05	0.68**	0.78**
Uruguay	-0.21	-0.47	-0.69	0.26	1.41	1.25	2.66	0.16
Venezuela	2.60***	-0.21	2.39**	2.81***	1.69**	-0.78	0.92	2.47***
Jordan	0.75	-0.20	0.55	$0.96^{*}$	0.19	1.51***	1.71*	-1.32**
South Africa	1.53***	1.43**	2.96***	0.10	-1.44***	-1.25*	-2.69**	-0.20

Table 7: Emerging market factor loadings.

Note: \*\*\*/\*\*/\* denotes significance at the 1/5/10% level.

	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$
A + L	0.26***		0.18		0.44**		0.08	
	(0.09)		(0.12)		(0.19)		(0.08)	
A + L(+)		0.12		0.06		0.18		0.07
		(0.09)		(0.13)		(0.20)		(0.09)
A+L(-)		0.40***		0.18		0.58**		0.22*
		(0.13)		(0.19)		(0.29)		(0.13)
A - L	-0.96***		-2.03***		-2.99***		1.07***	
	(0.34)		(0.46)		(0.74)		(0.31)	
A - L(+)		$1.50^{*}$		0.34		1.84		1.17
		(0.77)		(1.08)		(1.71)		(0.78)
$A - L\left(-\right)$		-1.35***		-2.85***		-4.20***		1.50***
		(0.49)		(0.69)		(1.08)		(0.49)
CapControls	-1.30*	-1.46**	-0.39	-0.47	-1.69	-1.92	-0.90	-0.99
	(0.69)	(0.62)	(0.91)	(0.88)	(1.48)	(1.39)	(0.62)	(0.63)
Inflation	$0.05^{*}$	$0.04^{*}$	0.00	-0.01	0.05	0.03	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Peg	0.83**	$1.10^{***}$	0.58	$0.91^{*}$	1.41*	2.02**	0.25	0.19
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.85)	(0.82)	(0.36)	(0.37)
X + M	-0.56	-1.06**	0.18	-0.37	-0.38	-1.43	-0.75*	-0.68
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.41)	(0.44)
X - M	2.18	2.82	4.86	$5.36^{*}$	7.03	8.18*	-2.68	-2.54
	(2.30)	(2.09)	(3.04)	(2.93)	(4.97)	(4.63)	(2.09)	(2.11)
$\mathrm{GDPpc}$	$0.59^{***}$	$0.50^{***}$	0.60**	$0.56^{**}$	1.18***	$1.06^{**}$	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.19)	(0.19)
EastEurope	$0.86^{*}$	$1.10^{***}$	$2.14^{***}$	2.34***	3.00***	3.45***	-1.29***	-1.24***
	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.96)	(0.90)	(0.40)	(0.41)
LatAm	-0.57	-0.49	-0.93*	-0.90*	-1.50*	-1.39*	0.37	0.40
	(0.42)	(0.38)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.92)	(0.85)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Adj. R2	0.49	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.56	0.62	0.47	0.47

Table 8: Results from regressions of the GFC factor loadings on macroeconomic variables.

Notes: Each regression has 58 observations. The factors are computed using data over the period 1996-2015. The variables A and L are the stocks of external assets and liabilities normalized by GDP. When a gross or net asset position is followed by a (+) all country observations where the net position is negative are replaced by zeros. When followed by a (-) all country observations that are positive are replaced by zeros. X and M are exports and imports divided by GDP. GDPpc is the log of per capita GDP, Inflation is the average annualized inflation rate over the period, EastEurope and LatAm are dummies if the country is in Eastern Europe or Latin America (see Table 1). Peg is the fraction of time over the 20 year period when the country had a pegged exchange rate, as defined by Shambaugh. CapControls is the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* denote significance at the 1/5/10% levels.

	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{out}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$	$\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$
$A^{debt} + L^{debt}$	0.66***	1	$0.65^{**}$	1	1.30***	1 ' 1	0.01	1 1
	(0.19)		(0.26)		(0.41)		(0.20)	
$A^{debt} + L^{debt} (+)$		0.30		0.39		0.69	· · · ·	-0.09
		(0.36)		(0.51)		(0.80)		(0.39)
$A^{debt} + L^{debt}(-)$		0.64***		0.48		1.13**		0.16
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		(0.24)		(0.34)		(0.53)		(0.26)
$A^{PE} + L^{PE}$	0.42	0.31	-0.29	-0.35	0.14	-0.05	0.71	0.66
	(0.90)	(0.92)	(1.27)	(1.30)	(1.99)	(2.02)	(0.96)	(0.98)
$A^{FDI} + L^{FDI}$	-0.27	-0.28	-0.42	-0.37	-0.69	-0.64	0.15	0.09
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.24)	(0.25)
$A^{debt} - L^{debt}$	-0.91***		-1.84***		-2.75***		0.92***	
	(0.33)		(0.46)		(0.72)		(0.35)	
$A^{debt} - L^{debt} (+)$		0.85		-0.40		0.45		1.25
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		(1.53)		(2.16)		(3.36)		(1.64)
$A^{debt} - L^{debt} (-)$		-0.93*		-2.23***		-3.16***		1.31**
		(0.52)		(0.73)		(1.14)		(0.56)
$A^{PE} - L^{PE}$	1.47	1.76	0.54	0.67	2.01	2.43	0.93	1.09
	(1.08)	(1.12)	(1.52)	(1.59)	(2.38)	(2.48)	(1.15)	(1.21)
$A^{FDI} - L^{FDI}$	-1.06	-0.93	-0.93	-0.86	-1.99	-1.79	-0.12	-0.06
	(1.10)	(1.12)	(1.55)	(1.58)	(2.43)	(2.46)	(1.18)	(1.20)
CapControls	-1.27**	-1.10*	-0.26	-0.06	-1.54	-1.16	-1.01	-1.04
	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.86)	(0.89)	(1.34)	(1.39)	(0.65)	(0.68)
Inflation	$0.04^{*}$	0.04	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05**	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
$\operatorname{Peg}$	1.19***	1.07**	$0.90^{*}$	0.94	2.09***	2.01**	0.30	0.13
	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.81)	(0.92)	(0.39)	(0.45)
X + M	-1.39**	-1.29*	-0.38	-0.45	-1.77	-1.73	-1.01	-0.84
	(0.65)	(0.67)	(0.91)	(0.96)	(1.42)	(1.49)	(0.69)	(0.72)
X - M	2.67	2.47	4.77	4.21	7.43	6.68	-2.10	-1.74
	(2.18)	(2.23)	(3.07)	(3.16)	(4.79)	(4.92)	(2.32)	(2.40)
GDPpc	$0.48^{**}$	0.48**	$0.49^{*}$	$0.49^{*}$	0.97**	0.97**	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.21)
EastEurope	$1.36^{***}$	$1.30^{***}$	2.68***	2.69***	4.03***	3.99***	-1.32***	-1.39***
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.92)	(0.95)	(0.45)	(0.46)
LatAm	-0.52	-0.51	-0.78	-0.78	-1.30	-1.29	0.26	0.27
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.91)	(0.92)	(0.44)	(0.45)
Adj. R2	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.62	0.65	0.64	0.44	0.43

Table 9: Results from regressions of the GFC factor loadings on macroeconomic variables.

Notes: See notes to Table 8.. The superscript FDI denotes and FDI based external A&L. The superscript debt denote portfolio debt and other external assets and liabilities, and the superscript PE denote portfolio equity external assets and liabilities.

	$A^{debt} - L^{debt} > 0$	$-0.2 < A^{debt} - L^{debt} < 0$	$A^{debt} - L^{debt} < 0.2$
	Net creditor	Small net debt	Large net debt
Number of Countries	16	23	19
Average $A^{debt} - L^{debt}$	0.35	-0.09	-0.49
Average $\lambda_1^{out} - \lambda_1^{in}$	0.23	-0.13	-0.71
Average $\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^{in}$	1.78	1.97	3.87

Table 10: Average net debt and average GFC factor loadings.

	$\lambda_2^{out}$	$\lambda_2^{out}$	$\lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} + \lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} + \lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} - \lambda_2^{in}$	$\lambda_2^{out} - \lambda_2^{in}$
$\mathbf{x}^{fuel}$	_	0.04	_	-0.18**		-0.14		0.22**
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.14)		(0.09)
$M^{fuel}$		0.05		0.09		0.13		-0.04
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.15)		(0.10)
$BBL^{con}$		0.00		$0.04^{***}$		0.03		-0.04***
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)
$BBL^{pro}$		-0.01		0.01		0.00		-0.02
		(0.21)		(0.21)		(0.35)		(0.23)
A + L	0.00	0.03	-0.10	-0.02	-0.09	0.00	0.10	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.12)
A - L	-0.08	-0.11	0.12	0.08	0.05	-0.03	-0.20	-0.20
	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.65)	(0.66)	(0.47)	(0.43)
CapControls	-0.03	-0.05	-0.93	-0.08	-0.96	-0.13	0.91	0.04
	(0.75)	(0.81)	(0.85)	(0.78)	(1.30)	(1.34)	(0.94)	(0.87)
Inflation	0.02	0.01	0.08**	0.13***	0.10*	0.14**	-0.05	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\operatorname{Peg}$	-0.55	-0.60	-0.80*	-0.57	-1.35*	-1.17	0.25	-0.04
	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.74)	(0.74)	(0.54)	(0.48)
X + M	-0.03	-0.15	0.67	0.13	0.64	-0.01	-0.70	-0.28
	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.85)	(0.94)	(0.62)	(0.61)
X - M	3.01	2.82	-2.59	0.82	0.42	3.63	$5.59^{*}$	2.00
	(2.51)	(2.90)	(2.84)	(2.77)	(4.34)	(4.76)	(3.15)	(3.08)
$GDP \ pc$	-0.45**	-0.39	-0.04	-0.13	-0.49	-0.52	-0.41	-0.26
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.28)	(0.27)
EastEurope	0.70	0.69	-0.78	-0.51	-0.08	0.18	1.49**	1.20**
	(0.48)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.84)	(0.88)	(0.61)	(0.57)
LatAm	0.68	0.70	$-1.16^{**}$	-0.59	-0.48	0.11	1.84***	1.29**
	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.80)	(0.86)	(0.58)	(0.55)
Adj. R2	0.26	0.20	0.22	0.40	0.28	0.30	0.14	0.33

Table 11: Results from regressions of the commodity price factor loadings on macroeconomic variables.

Notes: See notes to Table 8.  $X^{fuel}$  and  $M^{fuel}$  are fuel exports and imports, as a share of GDP. BBL<sup>con</sup> and BBL<sup>pro</sup> are crude oil consumption and production, measured in barrels per day multipled by the price of WTI crude oil, normalized by GDP. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* denote significance at the 1/5/10% levels.

	GFC Factor Loadings									
	)	$\lambda_1^{out} + \lambda_1^i$	n	,	$\lambda_1^{out}{-}\lambda_1^{in}$					
	Coeff.	SE	Adj R2	Coeff.	SE	Adj R2				
Base Regression			0.65			0.44				
Institutions	0.20	(0.68)	0.64	0.34	(0.33)	0.44				
Credit rating	0.01	(0.03)	0.64	-0.01	(0.01)	0.43				
Financial Dev.	0.18	(0.78)	0.64	-0.09	(0.38)	0.43				
Tariff	-0.05	(0.12)	0.64	0.00	(0.06)	0.43				
Gov't Deficit	0.04	(0.12)	0.64	-0.02	(0.06)	0.43				
Corporate tax	0.00	(0.02)	0.64	0.01	(0.01)	0.43				
Press freedom	-0.01	(0.03)	0.64	0.02	(0.01)	0.45				
Secondary school	0.03**	(0.01)	0.68	-0.01	(0.01)	0.45				
West Europe	-0.67	(1.34)	0.64	0.60	(0.65)	0.44				
Asia	-0.91	(1.28)	0.64	-0.80	(0.61)	0.45				
Private Dom. credit	0.02*	(0.01)	0.66	0.00	(0.01)	0.43				
FX Reserves	5.41	(4.53)	0.65	0.63	(2.23)	0.43				
Bank Soundness	-0.65	(0.58)	0.65	-0.13	(0.28)	0.43				
Capital $\operatorname{Controls}^2$	6.46	(5.14)	0.65	0.46	(2.54)	0.43				

Table 12: Effects of adding various additional variables to the base regressions in Tables 9 and 11.

Commodity Price Factor Loadings

	$\lambda_2^{out}{+}\lambda_2^{in}$				$\lambda_2^{out} {-} \lambda_2^{in}$		
	Coeff.	SE	Adj R2	Coeff.	SE	Adj R2	
Base Regression			0.30			0.33	
Institutions	0.03	(0.38)	0.28	-0.11	(0.37)	0.32	
Credit rating	0.00	(0.02)	0.28	0.00	(0.02)	0.32	
Financial Dev.	-0.65	(0.42)	0.29	-0.45	(0.41)	0.33	
Tariff	-0.08	(0.07)	0.29	-0.09	(0.07)	0.34	
Gov't Deficit	0.10	(0.07)	0.29	0.05	(0.06)	0.32	
Corporate tax	-0.01	(0.01)	0.28	0.02	(0.01)	0.35	
Press freedom	$0.04^{*}$	(0.02)	0.33	-0.01	(0.01)	0.32	
Secondary school	-0.01	(0.01)	0.29	0.01	(0.01)	0.35	
West Europe	-0.50	(0.70)	0.28	-0.15	(0.67)	0.32	
Asia	0.60	(0.69)	0.28	-0.04	(0.66)	0.32	
Private Dom. credit	0.01	(0.01)	0.30	0.01	(0.01)	0.33	
FX Reserves	7.90**	(2.25)	0.35	3.97	(2.31)	0.35	
Bank Soundness	-0.97**	(0.28)	0.35	-0.32	(0.28)	0.33	
Capital Controls <sup>2</sup>	7.06	(3.22)	0.31	-0.21	(3.07)	0.32	

Notes: The base regression in the case of the GFC factor is the regression specification in columns 5 and 7 of Table 9, and the base regression in the case of the commodity price factor is the regression in columns 6 and 8 of Table 11. 48