
Did ECB Liquidity Injections Help The Real Economy?


Stine Louise Daetz Copenhagen Business School

Marti G. Subrahmanyam NYU Stern School of Business

Dragon Yongjun Tang The University of Hong Kong

Sarah Qian Wang The University of Warwick





ECB LTRO



Daetz,Subrahmanyam,Tang,Wang

Bank of England, Haldane et al., Oct. 2016

- "[QE's] effects on the yield curve, equity prices, corporate bond spreads and the exchange rate were all large and significant."
- "What ultimately matters for monetary policy, however, is the impact of these asset purchases on the economy."
- "In general, however, estimates are quite uncertain."





Mario Draghi: "Monetary Policy Works!"

- 2015/09/03 by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB: "I would say that our accommodative monetary policy is being passed through to the rest of the economy. ... So we have evidence that our monetary policy works. ...so we'll have to see whether these effects are transitory or are permanent."
 - o <u>https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150903.en.html</u>
- 2016/07/21: "the Governing Council will continue to monitor economic and financial market developments very closely and to safeguard the pass-through of its accommodative monetary policy to the real economy. … Let me now explain our assessment … Domestic demand remains supported by the pass-through of our monetary policy measures to the real economy. Favorable financing conditions and improvements in corporate profitability continue to promote a recovery in investment."

o https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160721.en.html



The Objection: "Failure to Spark"

- 2015/09/08: *Financial Times*: "Despite cheap credit and low interest rates, many companies say it is still too early to spend"
- Ralf Thomas, CFO of Siemens: *"Investments are driven far more by assumptions around growth, potential profit and technological barriers to entry, rather than movements in interest rates... We don't decide to spend more just because interest rates are lower for a couple of years."*



\$1.1 trillion

Cash piles at European non-financial companies, up 40% from 2008





Our Study: LTRO and Corporate Policies

• Liquidity transmission from macro to micro?

ECB LTRO \rightarrow Bank Liquidity \rightarrow Credit Supply to Firms \rightarrow Corporate Liquidity \rightarrow Corporate Investment?

- Cash holdings
- Debt structure
- Investment
- Employment



Findings and Contributions


- LTRO \rightarrow more cash, but no increase in investment
 - Even if banks keep the funds for longer time
- Without LTRO, Eurozone could have fared worse
- Fiscal-monetary policy interaction is important
- Cross-country analysis
- Existing studies
 - o securities markets programme (SMP) asset purchases
 - o on banks/financial markets
 - o specific countries, often one at a time
 - related work from U.S./U.K., e.g., Berger and Roman (2016 *JFQA*), Weale and Wieladek (2016 *JME*)
 - Negative credit supply shocks decrease investment, but little work on the effectiveness of positive credit supply shocks



Data

9

- 21 Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries
- 6,620 non-financial firms
- Sample period: 2002-2014
- Compustat Global; Capital IQ, S&P Ratings
- DealScan
- Markit CDS
- The World Bank
- Transparency International
- ECB Statistics Warehouse
- Bloomberg
- Key measure: *LTRO Uptake*



LTRO Uptake

11

	LTRO I: Dec. 2011 EUR billion	LTRO II: Feb. 2012 EUR billion	Total EUR billion	LTRO Uptake % of government debt
Country	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Austria	3.66	7.83	11.49	4.82
Belgium	45.28	43.71	88.99	25.02
France	5.59	6.52	12.12	0.61
Germany	12.25	13.13	25.38	1.67
Greece	$60.94~^{a}$		$60.94^{\ a}$	25.54
Ireland	21.91	17.62	39.52	22.33
Italy	172.08	128.11	300.20	15.92
Netherlands	8.86	1.96	10.81	2.58
Portugal	24.54	24.76	49.30	29.37
Spain	153.21	165.53	318.74	51.44
Total	508.32	409.17	917.49	

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LTRO and Corporate Cash Holdings

12

	Cash	Cas	h
		High Bank Debt	Low Bank Deb
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LTRO Uptake	2.169***	2.609***	0.166
	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.98)
Industry Sigma	0.021	0.102***	-0.016
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Cash Flow/Assets	0.001	0.000	0.004
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Market to Book	0.014***	0.015***	0.015^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Size	-0.113	-0.714***	0.662^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)



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LTRO and Debt Financing

13


	Leverage (1)	Net Debt (2)	Short-term Debt (3)
LTRO Uptake	4.420***	3.554***	-0.012***
Industry Sigma	(0.65) 0.112*** (0.01)	(1.15) 0.106*** (0.02)	(0.00) 0.001***
Cash Flow/Assets	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.00)
	-0.059***	-0.123***	-0.000**
Market to Book	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
	0.008***	0.051***	0.000
Size	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
	2.640^{***}	-3.271***	0.001
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.00)



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LTRO and Investment/Wage

15

	nves	stments	Wag	ges
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LTRO Uptake	-1.695^{***}	-1.350***	-0.145	-0.101
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Cash Flow/Assets	0.009^{***}	0.005**	-0.004***	-0.007***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Market to Book	0.004***	0.004***	0.000***	0.000^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Size	0.127^{***}	0.218***	0.675^{***}	0.365^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Time fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-square	0.568	0.597	0.787	0.790
Ν	86392	64635	51997	47910

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Firm Operating Environment

16)

	Inves	tments	Investr	nents
	High Competition	Low Competition	High Corp. Tax	Low Corp. Tax
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LTRO Uptake	-1.575***	-1.324***	-1.188***	- 2.644***
	(0.27)	(0.43)	(0.29)	(0.76)
Cash Flow/Assets	0.010***	-0.000	0.005***	0.025^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Market to Book	0.003***	0.005***	0.004^{***}	0.004***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Size	0.302***	0.472***	0.041	0.351^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)

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Connection with LTRO Participating Banks

17

	Cash	Leverage	Net Debt	Short Debt	Investment	Wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LTRO Uptake	3.242***	3.004**	3.113	-0.029***	1.772**	-0.063
	(1.01)	(1.40)	(1.93)	(0.00)	(0.81)	(0.22)
LTRO-Bank Relati	on					
x LTRO Uptake	-1.828	2.229	4.652^{**}	0.012	-3.736***	0.131
	(1.18)	(1.63)	(2.25)	(0.01)	(0.94)	(0.26)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-square	0.727	0.767	0.785	0.786	0.316	0.715
Ν	30420	30420	24742	23064	24715	19091
					Wit	th
	=1 if the fit	rm has borrow	ved from a		bar	nking
	participati	ng bank in the	e past five	years	rela	ationship

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Other Analysis

18

- 2008-2014 period
- Large versus small firms
- Bank-level LTRO uptake

	$\frac{\text{Cash}}{(1)}$	(2)	(3) Net Debt	Short Debt (4)	Investment (5)	Wages (6)
Log(LTRO Bank Uptake)	0.070***	0.098***	0.172***	-0.000*	-0.017	0.003
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-square	0.728	0.765	0.786	0.782	0.304	0.717
Ν	26692	26692	21597	20118	21671	16691





Why Investments Not Increasing?

19

• Demand


No.

- "counterfactual analysis"
- Policy interactions: fiscal vs. monetary





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Institutional Environment

21

h Corruption (1)	Low Corruption (2)	High Gov. Debt	Low Gov. Debt
(1)	(9)		
	(2)	(3)	(4)
2.515	-1.909^{***}	2.113***	-1.346***
(2.67)	(0.25)	(0.78)	(0.31)
0.034^{***}	0.008***	0.017***	0.005^{**}
(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***
(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
0.320***	0.111***	0.146***	0.214***
(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
	0.034*** (0.00) 0.003*** (0.00) 0.320***	$\begin{array}{cccc} (2.67) & (0.25) \\ 0.034^{***} & 0.008^{***} \\ (0.00) & (0.00) \\ 0.003^{***} & 0.004^{***} \\ (0.00) & (0.00) \\ 0.320^{***} & 0.111^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

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Eurozone vs. Non-Eurozone ("counterfactual"]

- Even though non-Eurozone was not subject to LTRO directly, they have their own interventions
- <u>2016/08/04</u>: the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee voted to introduce a package of measures to support growth and achieve a sustainable return of inflation to the target:
 - a 25bp cut in Bank Rate to 0.25%;
 - a new Term Funding Scheme to reinforce the pass-through of the cut in Bank Rate;
 - the purchase of up to £10bn of UK corporate bonds, financed by the creation of central bank reserves;
 - an expansion of UK government bond purchases by £60bn to £435bn, also financed by the creation of central bank reserves.



Eurozone vs. Non-Eurozone

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	2	3	
	Cash	Cas	h
	Full sample	High-Risk Sovereign	Low-Risk Sovereign
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LTRO Dummy x Non-Eurozone	-0.969***	0.020	-1.050***
	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.15)
R-square	0.751	0.677	0.762
N	143731	35385	103686
	Investment	Investn	nents
	Full sample	High-Risk Sovereign	Low-Risk Sovereign
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LTRO Dummy x Non-Eurozone	-0.519***	-0.979***	-0.408***
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.06)
R-square	0.583	0.518	0.617
Ν	149798	37088	107834
	Wages	Wa	ges
	Full sample	High-Risk Sovereign	Low-Risk Sovereign
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LTRO Dummy x Non-Eurozone	-0.068***	-0.088***	-0.153***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
R-square	0.772	0.832	0.769
N	91049	19222	69184



LTRO and Investment/Wage: Bank Dependence

25

	Inves	tments	Wag	jes
	High Bank Debt	Low Bank Debt	High Bank Debt	Low Bank Debt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LTRO Uptake	-1.286***	-1.123***	-0.023	-0.199
	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Cash Flow/Assets	0.015^{***}	0.007^{***}	-0.006***	-0.004***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Market to Book	0.007^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.000	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Size	0.184***	0.087**	0.712^{***}	0.668***
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)

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Bank LTRO Uptake

26

• Similar results when we use bank-level LTRO uptake measure instead of country-level:

	Investments (1)	Wages (2)
LTRO-Bank Uptake	-0.532*** (0.11)	0.020 (0.05)





LTRO Repayment

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	Cash	Leverage	Net Debt	Short-term Debt	Investments	Wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LTRO-Bank Uptake	8.194***	19.685***	17.435***	0.024	-0.695	-0.097
	(1.82)	(3.01)	(3.78)	(0.01)	(1.06)	(0.26)
<i>R</i> -square	0.634	0.739	0.739	0.809	0.544	0.834
Ν	4845	4845	4053	3867	5116	2988
Panel B: Medium Ea	rly LTRO Repay	Iment				
	Cash	Leverage	Net Debt	Short-term Debt	Investments	Wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LTRO-Bank Uptake	-0.908***	-0.536	0.194	-0.012***	-0.528***	0.007
	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.00)	(0.11)	(0.06)
<i>R</i> -square	0.768	0.777	0.810	0.791	0.640	0.681
Ν	17032	17032	13573	12828	17883	11246
Panel C: High Early	LTRO Repayme	ent				
	Cash	Leverage	Net Debt	Short-term Debt	Investments	Wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LTRO-Bank Uptake	15.915	-11.308	-8.542	-0.121	9.938**	1.398
	(9.96)	(11.4)	(14.3)	(0.07)	(3.95)	(2.07)
R-square	0.717	0.766	0.783	0.737	0.572	0.774
Ν	9116	9116	7675	6931	9506	5433



Fiscal vs. Monetary Policies

28

- "If countries don't tackle fiscal problems, monetary policy will become utterly irrelevant"
 - -former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 2015/09/04
- "Monetary policy has exhausted its influence, that is why we are so keen on tax arrangements that support investment"



—Scott Morrison, Treasurer of Australia, 2016/10/30





Run Out of Magic?

29

- 2016/09/08, Mario Draghi: "there are limits to monetary policy"
 - "we have numbers showing the impact of our monetary policy on growth and inflation over the forecast horizon. I think – but I should check – because I don't remember them exactly – I think it's 0.5% over the forecast horizon as far as growth is concerned, and I think it's 0.3% as far as inflation. Or – but we'll have to check that. Let me do this. I'll check and let you know after. Or it's 0.3% and 0.5% – it's either – over the forecast horizon, from now. I think we should be able to give you full figures in a moment."
 - "It's an accumulated upward impact on GDP growth of 0.6% over the projection horizon"
- "... elected governments that have the money should be spending more ... to start and grow a business."
- "... it is now up to governments to break out of the vicious circle"





Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interactions

Dixit and Lambertini (2003 *AER*):

• "[fiscal and monetary policy interactions] can lead to very different macroeconomic outcomes than those predicted by the analysis of one policy in isolation"

The heterogeneity in Eurozone fiscal policies provides a good setting for analysis!







Role of Fiscal Policies

			31			
	Investments			Investments		
	Increased	Unchanged	Decreased	Increased	Decreased	
	Corporate Tax	Corporate Tax	Corporate Tax	Gov. Investment	Gov. Investmen	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
LTRO Uptake	-8.425***	-1.630***	25.052**	2.249***	-1.825***	
Cash Flow/Assets	(1.31)	(0.31)	(9.80)	(0.70)	(0.29)	
	5 0.012***	0.006^{***}	0.021^{***}	0.018***	0.003*	
Market to Book	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
	0.004***	0.004***	0.005^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.004^{***}	
Size	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
	-0.259***	0.273^{***}	0.268***	-0.048	0.255^{***}	
Leverage	(0.05) -0.017***	(0.04) -0.016***	(0.08) -0.011***	(0.05) - 0.015^{***}	(0.04)-0.017***	
Rated	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
	0.242	0.429***	-0.651	0.185	0.405^{**}	
Sov. CDS	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.48)	(0.19)	(0.15)	
	-9.047**	-2.994	-0.663***	-0.476***	-3.838*	
Sov. Export	(3.51)	(2.88)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(2.07)	
	0.204^{***}	-0.007	-0.045***	-0.134***	-0.008	
-	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	

ECB LTRO

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Role of Fiscal Policies

32

• Bank-level LTRO uptake

J	Investments				Investments	
	Increased	Unchanged	Decreased	Ir	ncreased	Decreased
	Corp. Tax	Corp. Tax	Corp. Tax	Gov.	Investment	Gov. Investment
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)
LTRO-Bank Uptake	0.182	-1.039***	7.916*	-0).402***	-0.495**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(4.38)		(0.14)	(0.24)
<i>R</i> -square	0.665	0.578	0.609		0.608	0.605
Ν	9013	17486	6006		13897	18608

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Summary and Conclusions

Cash holdings of Eurozone firms increase after LTRO

33

- But investments do not increase with LTRO
- Monetary transmission does not guarantee growth
- Caveat: non-Eurozone of EU fared even worse
 LTRO might have halted the deterioration of investment
- Early repayment is associated with more investment
- May need the support of fiscal policies to spark corporate investments
- Negative credit supply shocks decrease investments, but liquidity injections may not boost investment



