

# Effects of U.S. Quantitative Easing on Emerging Market Economies

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October 12, 2017

## Motivation

- ▶ With the short-term interest rate at the ZLB since late 2008, the Federal Reserve of the US engaged in quantitative easing (QE) policy
- ▶ This paper aims to study both domestic and international spillover effects of QE
- ▶ “Among the advanced economies, the mutual benefits of monetary easing are clear. The case of emerging market economies is more complicated.” (former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in a speech in 2013)
- ▶ “Fragile Five” countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey) thought to be particularly vulnerable to the withdrawal of QE
  - ▶ “This (economic) crisis...will not be overcome ... through quantitative easing policies that have triggered what can only be described as a monetary tsunami, have led to a currency war, and have introduced new and perverse forms of protectionism in the world.” (former President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff in a speech in 2012)
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- ▶ Literature largely focuses on “announcement effects” of QE
  - ▶ Analyze effects around narrow 1/2-day windows following policy announcements
  - ▶ Advantages: easy to establish causality/exogeneity
  - ▶ Disadvantages: high-frequency financial variables only; dynamic effects?
- ▶ Employ a framework suitable for
  - ▶ Inferring both real and financial implications of US QE policies
  - ▶ Analyzing dynamic effects

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## What we do

- ▶ Bayesian structural VAR for the US
  - ▶ Balance sheet variable as a policy instrument
  - ▶ Non-recursive short-run restrictions to identify the US QE shock
- ▶ Using the US QE shock as an external shock, assess effects on EM countries in a panel VAR
  - ▶ Panel of 13 EM countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey + Chile, Colombia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand
- ▶ Monthly data for the period from January 2008 through November 2014



## Related literature

- ▶ Announcement effects
  - ▶ Gagnon et al (2010); Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
- ▶ VAR based identification
  - ▶ Gambacorta et al (2014); Baumeister and Benati (2011); Wright (2011)
- ▶ Purchase effects
  - ▶ D'Amico and King (2013)
- ▶ International effects of US QE policies
  - ▶ Neely (2010); Chen et al (2011); Glick and Leduc (2011); Bauer and Neely (2013); Rogers et al (2014)
- ▶ Effects on emerging markets/Fragile Five of taper scare
  - ▶ Eichengreen and Gupta (2013); Dahlhaus and Vasistha (2014); Aizenman et al (2014)

# US VAR

- ▶ Structural VAR for the US economy

$$A_0 y_t = A_1 y_{t-1} + \dots + A_p y_{t-p} + \varepsilon_t$$

where  $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, I_m)$

- ▶  $y_t$  includes
  - ▶ Output, prices, long-term Treasury yields, equity prices
  - ▶ Securities held outright

## QE policy rule

- ▶ The Fed's QE policy is approximated by a linear policy rule
  - ▶ Analogous to the Taylor-type reaction function for conventional monetary policy
- ▶ The policy instrument is the securities held outright on the Fed's balance sheet
  - ▶ Holdings of Treasury securities, federal agency debt securities, and mortgage-backed securities
  - ▶ Measure of size, not composition of assets
  - ▶ Approach similar to Gambacorta et al (2014)
- ▶ The Fed observes/responds to current long-term Treasury yields
  - ▶ Other variables only with lags
- ▶ The non-systematic component of policy is isolated as a QE shock

## US QE shock identification

- ▶ Use non-recursive restrictions on  $A_0$  for identification of the QE shock  $\varepsilon_{QE,t}$ 
  - ▶ Restrictions on short-run responses of the variables
- ▶ Sims and Zha (2006a,b) and Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996)  
identification table
- ▶ We add to the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model a QE reaction function similar to our empirically identified one and assess the transmission of the QE shock.

# Domestic effects of QE Shock

- ▶ A positive shock to asset purchase by the central bank leads to a positive effect on output, inflation, asset price and a negative effect on interest rate spreads
- ▶ Empirical IRF, Model-based IRF
- ▶ Our effects smaller than effects of QE 1 programs but similar to those of QE 2 programs Magnitude

## Panel VAR for EM countries

- ▶ The estimated US QE shock  $\varepsilon_{QE,t}$  as an external shock in a panel VAR for EM countries
- ▶ An equation for the  $i$ -th country in the panel VAR

$$z_{i,t} = \sum_{h=1}^p B_{i,h} z_{i,t-h} + \sum_{h=0}^q D_{i,h} \varepsilon_{QE,t-h} + \sum_{j=1}^k C_{i,j} x_{j,t} + u_{i,t}$$

where  $u_{i,t} \sim N(0, \Sigma_i)$


- ▶ Dynamic heterogeneity but random coefficients around the common mean
  - ▶ Partially pool cross-sectional information (Canova (2007), Canova and Ciccarelli (2013))

## Panel VAR for EM countries

- ▶ We include
  - ▶ Baseline 4 variables (IP, CPI, USD exchange rate, and M2) for  $z_{i,t}$
  - ▶ US QE shock  $\varepsilon_{QE,t}$  as an external shock, and
  - ▶ World demand and price for commodities are controlled for
- ▶ After baseline estimation, we add one additional variable at a time
  - ▶ Stock price, long-term yields, EMBI, cumulative equity flows, net exports to the US
- ▶ Also a panel VAR with financial variables only
  - ▶ USD exchange rate, stock price, long-term yields, cumulative equity flows

# US QE shock


Shock series and growth in securities held outright






# Spillover effects of US QE shock

Baseline variables + one variable at a time of all countries




# Spillover effects of US QE shock

financial variables only



# Spillover effects of US QE shock


Baseline variables + one variable at a time for the Fragile Five vs. Non-Fragile Five (I)




# Spillover effects of US QE shock

Baseline variables + one variable at a time for the Fragile Five vs. Non-Fragile Five (II)


## Stock prices




## Long-term int. rates




## EMBI



## Capital flows



## Net exp. to US



## Spillover effects of US QE shock

- ▶ Spillover of QE into international financial markets
- ▶ Financial variables in the “Fragile Five” responded stronger
- ▶ Similar results including Mexico in the Fragile Five group, allowing for short term interest rate as policy instrument or different lag lengths, and by using a shadow rate shock
  - ▶ Why did “Fragile Five” respond stronger?
  - ▶ Real effects?

## Why did the Fragile Five respond stronger?

- ▶ Asset markets offering higher returns prior to the crisis

	Fragile Five	Rest of EM
Long-term interest rates	15.02	4.96
Stock prices	2.15	1.73

- ▶ Suggests the “reaching for yield” or “risk-taking” channel of the international monetary policy transmission


## What makes financial markets of the Fragile Five “fragile”?

- ▶ The Fragile Five countries also had more imbalances prior to the crisis

	Fragile Five	Rest of EM
Current Account to GDP	-0.57	2.58
Fiscal Balance to GDP	-3.66	-1.05
Government Debt to GDP	59.7	34.5

# Spillover effects of shadow rate shock

Baseline variables + one variable at a time of all countries






## Extensions and Robustness of US QE Shock

- ▶ Extended 7 variable US VAR: private sector yields and other asset prices
- ▶ Alternate measures of output, prices, and long-term Treasury yields in baseline US VAR
- ▶ Effects on consumption and housing market
- ▶ Role of the liquidity prior


# A larger US VAR

## Corporate yields plus NEER



# A larger US VAR

## Mortgage yields plus housing prices



# Robustness

## Additional robustness checks and extensions

- ▶ Alternate output measures: real GDP, Coincident index, non-farm payroll
- ▶ Alternate price measures: CPI
- ▶ Alternate long-term interest rates: 5- and 20- year Treasury yields
- ▶ Durable and nondurable consumption in addition to output

## Conclusion

- ▶ Strong and consistent effects on both real and financial variables of the US economy. The QE shock is estimated to
  - ▶ Increase IP and PCE Deflator
  - ▶ Lower long-term yields
  - ▶ Increase stock prices
- ▶ Relatively strong spillover effects on financial variables but weak effects on macro variables
  - ▶ Appreciation against USD
  - ▶ Reduction in long-term yields
  - ▶ Stock market boom
  - ▶ More inflows to the equity markets
  - ▶ No significant effect on IP and CPI
- ▶ The Fragile Five countries appear to respond more strongly than others

## US QE shock identification

- ▶ Restrictions on  $A_0$  (similar to Sims and Zha 2006)

	Industrial production	PCE deflator	Securities held-outright	10-year Treasury yields	S&P500 index
Prod1	X				
Prod2	X	X			
I	X	X	X	X	X
F	X	X	$a_1$	$a_2$	
MP			$a_3$	$a_4$	

- ▶ “X”: the corresponding coefficient of  $A_0$  is not restricted
- ▶ Blanks: the corresponding coefficient of  $A_0$  is restricted to zero
- ▶ “a”s: weakly restricted with the liquidity priors,  $Corr(-a_1, a_2) = -0.8$  and  $Corr(a_3, -a_4) = 0.8$

- ▶ Mainslides

# US QE shock

## Effects in terms of the size of intervention

- ▶ Baseline estimates suggest 40 billion dollars in securities purchased by the Fed reduces 10-year treasury yields by 10 bp on impact
- ▶ Comparison with “announcement effects” estimates is tricky as the measure of policy shock is different
- ▶ Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
  - ▶ Estimate effects on 10-year Treasury yields around QE 1 and QE 2 dates
- ▶ Our effects smaller than effects of QE 1 programs but similar to those of QE 2 programs
- ▶ [Main slides](#)

## QE reaction function

- ▶ We consider the following QE reaction function:  $\psi_t = \rho_\psi \psi_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_\psi)[(\kappa E_t(R_{k,t+1} - R_{t+1}) - \kappa_\pi \pi_{t-1} - \kappa_y (y_{t-1} - y_{t-2}))] + \varepsilon_{\psi,t}$ 
  - ▶  $\psi_t$  reflects actual asset purchases/credit intermediation by the central bank
  - ▶  $E_t(R_{k,t+1} - R_{t+1})$  is the expected interest rate spread (between returns to capital and a safe interest rate) in the model
  - ▶  $\pi_t$  is inflation, and  $y_t - y_{t-1}$  is output growth
  - ▶ [Main slides](#)




# Variance decomposition of US VAR

Contribution of US QE shock (%)

	IP	PCE Deflator	Securities held-outright	10-year Treasury yields	S&P500 index
Impact	0 [0,0]	0 [0,0]	55 [33, 78]	31 [10,51]	3 [0, 6]
3 months	1 [0, 1]	3 [0, 5]	51 [29, 74]	17 [2, 33]	6 [1, 12]
6 months	4 [0, 8]	7 [2, 13]	50 [28, 72]	17 [1, 33]	12 [2, 21]
12 months	15 [4, 26]	15 [5, 26]	38 [19,57]	18 [2,36]	18 [4,33]


**Notes:** Mean and [16%, 84% quantiles].

# IRFs of US variables to a unit QE shock



Main slides

# Model-based IRFs of US variables to a unit QE shock



## A larger US VAR

- ▶ Identifying restrictions on extended 7-variable VAR

	IP	PCE Deflator	Securities held outright	10-year yields	Private yields	S&P500 index	Asset Price
Prod1	X						
Prod2	X	X					
I1	X	X	X	X	X	X	
I2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
F1	X	X	$a_1$	$a_2$			
F2	X	X	X	X	X		
MS			$a_3$	$a_4$			

- ▶ Private sector yields: BoFA Merrill Lynch US corporate 10-15 year index, 30 year conventional mortgage rates
- ▶ Additional asset prices: effective exchange rate, Core Logic house price index