



Discussion of “Is automating AI research enough for a growth explosion?” by Davidson, Halperin, Houlden, and Korinek

Paul Luk

**Research Department
Hong Kong Monetary Authority**

**Presentation at the International Conference
on Generative Artificial Intelligence (Gen(AI))
10 April 2025**

Disclaimer



- **The presentation represents the views of the authors, which are not necessarily the views of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.**

Research Question




- **How does the ‘self-improving’ feature of AI affect the condition that leads to an economic singularity?**
 - Singularity means infinite growth in finite time.
- **Do current estimates of research productivity point in the direction of a singularity?**



What this paper does

- **A semi-endogenous growth framework (Jones, 1995).**
 - Focus on supply side. No demand side.
 - AI modelled as a technology that improves effective labour.
 - Feedback loops due to software and hardware improvement.

Figure 1: Channels for Impact of Software and Hardware Improvements



Main finding 1: AI relaxes condition for singularity



- Even though ideas are getting harder to find (Bloom et al. , 2020), i.e.:

$$g_{At} = vA_t^{\phi-1}\hat{L}_t^\lambda, \quad \phi < 1,$$

- if effective labour ($\hat{L}_t$) is increasing in technology, i.e. $\frac{\partial \hat{L}_t}{\partial A_t} > 0$, then constant or exponential growth can occur.
- The condition for singularity is further relaxed with feedback loops.

Main finding 2: Automating ~13% of tasks leads to singularity



- **Singularity condition:**

$$f_Y + \frac{1}{\alpha} f_A r_A + f_h r_h + f_z r_z > 1,$$

- f_x = share of automated tasks in sector x,
 - r_x = returns to research in sector x.
- **Singularity requires automating around 13% of tasks in each domain.**



Comment 1: estimates of r

- **Large uncertainty on estimates of returns to research (r).**
 - $r = \frac{\Delta \text{research output}}{\Delta \text{research input}}$
 - Research input is hard to measure.
- **How stable is r in the future?**
- **Low automation share mainly driven by large r on hardware research.**
 - Moore's law: *"Doubling of the number of transistors on a chip every 2 years."*
 - If $r_h = 2$ instead of 5, the automation share goes up from 13% to ~22%.

Comment/Question 2: reconciling with other estimates



- **How to reconcile with less optimistic estimates?**
 - Acemoglu (2024): Total TFP effect is 0.7% in next 10 years.
 - Nordhaus (2021): Singularity is not near. (in the order of a century)
- **Slow technology diffusion**
 - Solow (1987): *“You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”*
- **Does AI improve or reduce productivity?**
 - Addictive AI algorithms.

Comment 3: preferences and incentives



- **Supply side:**

- How does incentive to innovate arise?
 - Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019): depends on factor prices.

- **Demand side:**

- Can all goods and services be produced by AI (e.g. company and care by human beings)?
- Baumol's cost disease: if people have inelastic demand for these other goods not produced by AI, then expenditure share of these goods will rise.

Concluding remarks



- **Thought-provoking paper on future of human societies.**
- **Enlightening theoretical analysis**
 - showing the possibility that AI and automation may relax the condition for singularity.
- **Numerical results subject to uncertainty.**